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STRICT CONSTRUCTION AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
UNDER THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE: MEETING RAOUL
BERGER ON INTERPRETIVIST GROUNDS
Paul R. .Dimond*

In Government by the Judiciary, Raoul Berger argues that the legislative debates on the Reconstruction amendments and their enforcement acts reveal that the equal protection clause was intended
to prohibit only racially partial state legislation that affects specific
civil rights concerning the security of person and property. 1 Berger
urges that this narrow reading of the framers' intent should limit review under the fourteenth amendment of all claims of racial discrimination and that any broader judicial interpretation of the equal
protection clause, as in the 1954 school desegregation ruling, usurps
the policy-making functions vested in Congress or reserved to the
states and to the people. 2 Berger's theses are not new,3 but their application would immunize much official racial discrimination from
judicial scrutiny and challenge the legitimacy of many court decisions that protect racial minorities from majoritarian abuse or
neglect. 4
Berger's construction has been challenged elsewhere on a
number of grounds. Some argue that its interpretivist theory of judi• Associate Professor of Law, American University. B.A. 1966, Amherst College; J.D.
1969, University of Michigan. - Ed.
The Ford Foundation, Carnegie Corporation, and American University and Michigan
Law Schools supported research for this Article. Mary Hendriksen provided substantial research assistance; and Robert Abrams, Gail Brown, Yale Kamisar, Burton Wechsler, and Peter Westen offered comments and criticisms on early drafts. Responsibility for the views
expressed herein rests with the author alone.
l. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 18-36, 133, 169, 176, 191 (1977).
2. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 133, 191-92, 249-50, 407-18.
3. See, e.g., L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 54-55 (1958); Fairman, JJoes the Fourteenth
Amendment Incorporate the Bill ofRights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949). q: L. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932) (arguing no power of judicial review, rather than abuse of
power).
4. See, e.g., R. BERGER,.rupra note 1, at 117-33. q: id. at 69-98 (reapportionment), 211-12,
258-82 (access to the courts, fair criminal procedures, privacy, and free speech as against the
states). At this late date, however, Berger would limit rather than overrule decisions that have
raised (or settled) "expectations," at least where "confirmed by every decent instinct." Id. at
413.
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cial review fails to comprehend the Supreme Court's institutional
mission, such as its role in articulating the contemporary meaning of
sweeping phrases like equal protection5 and in policing our democratic system to ensure that the majority will neither exclude the minority from the political process nor systematically ignore its
interests. 6 Others argue that Berger's preoccupation with the legislative debates leads to a disabling myopia concerning the nature of the
regional struggles and political battles joined during Reconstruction.
These conflicts both complicate and enrich any analysis of the Reconstruction era's response to the problems of federalism, the economy, politics, and racism. 7 In this Article, however, I will meet
Berger's argument on his own interpretivist turf. 8
There has been much scholarly controversy over the "original
understanding" of the fourteenth amendment: Even Alexander
Bickel's search for the elusive fundamental values that he thought
the Court should strive to define began with a review of the framers'
intent.9 Bickel argued that the contemporaneous debates show that
Congress intended neither to outlaw dual schooling in 1866 nor to
prevent Congress or the Court from outlawing it in the future, as the
Court did in Brown v. Board of Education . 10 He suggested that the
lack of specific intent regarding such questions as school segregation
can be attributed to the framers' desires to avoid immediate controversy and to permit future development. I I To the bane of self-styled
"strict constructionists" of every stripe, Bickel subsequently con5. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 100-10 (1962); R. DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978); Brest, The Misconceived Questfar the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); Grey, J)o We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L.
REV. 703 (1975); Sandalow, Constitutional Interpretation, 19 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1039 (1981).
6. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 11-41 (1980); Brest, The Supreme Court,
1975 Term -Foreword: In J)ej'ense of the Anti-/)iscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. I
(1976); Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & Pua. AFF. 107 (1976).
1. See, e.g., Curtis, The Bill ofRights as a Limitation on State Authority: A Reply to Professor Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 45 (1980); Kutler, Raoul Berger's Fourteenth Amendment:
A History or Ahistorical?, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 511 (1979); Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights:
A Critique ofRaoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 651 (1979); Murphy, Book Review, 81
YALE L.J. 1752 (1978). Other reviewers have found Berger's historical account compelling.
See, e.g., Abraham, Reflections on Government by Judiciary, 6 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 467
(1979); Perry, Book Review, 18 COLUM. L. REV. 685 (1978).
8. Cf. Berger, The Fourteenth Amendment: Light from the F(fteenth, 14 Nw. U. L. REV.
311,361 (1979) (challenging critics of his view ''to cite chapter and verse" from the historical
record). This Article will lay out at least the chapters and cite to the verses supporting an
alternative reading.
9. Compare A. BICKEL, supra note 5, and Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation J)ecision, 69 HARV. L. REV. I (1955), with A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970), and A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT (1975).
10. A. BICKEL, supra note 5, at 100-05; Bickel, supra note 9, 69 HARV. L. REV. at 56-65.
11. A. BICKEL, supra note 5, at 102-03.
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eluded that the legislative record concerning the broad constitutional
phrases cannot produce "specific answers to specific present
problems," and that to ask it to do so is "to ask the wrong question.
With adequate scholarship, the answer that must emerge in the vast
majority of cases is no answer . . . for the excellent reason that the
Constitution was not framed to be a catalogue of answers to such
questions." 12 Bickel's view has been endorsed by others: As Terrance Sandalow put this point, ''To ask, in each instance, whether
the framers 'intended' the specific or the general is to pose a question
that almost invariably is unanswerable." 13
In the face of this common understanding of the vagueness of
much of the constitutional text, 14 Berger bears the burden of proving
that the equal protection clause was intended to enumerate specific,
narrow protections against racial discrimination. This Article examines several contemporary sources to determine whether he has accomplished that task. It proceeds in six parts. Part I analyzes the
text of the fourteenth amendment and contemporaneous congressional views on judicial review. Contrary to Berger's construction,
the equal protection clause is not limited by its terms to the privileges or immunities clause or to the specific rights enumerated in the
1866 Civil Rights Act. Similarly, the Reconstruction Congress repeatedly acted to confirm and to expand the judiciary's power to review state conduct for compliance with the Civil War amendments
and their enforcement acts. Part II examines the wide range of racial
evils and official neglect that provided the backdrop for action by the
framers shortly before and after passage of the fourteenth amendment. Part III then demonstrates that the language used by John
Bingham in the key clauses of section 1 was not intended to invoke
the narrow code meanings traced by Berger; rather, it referred to
broader, albeit not specifically defined, antidiscrimination principles.
Part IV shows that the limited debate in Congress on Bingham's final
proposal supports rather than rebuts this open-ended interpretation
of the equal protection clause. These materials, taken together,
suggest that Berger's narrow reading denies the fourteenth amendment's actual role as a general protection against official caste
discrimination.
12. Id at 102-03.
13. Sandalow, supra note 5, at 1036.
14. Federalists, noninterpretivists, and so-called strict constructionists share this view. See,
e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (Marshall, C.J.); J. ELY, supra
note 6, at 1-41, 185-204; Bork, Neutral Principles and Some Firs/ Amendment Problems, 47 IND.
LJ. I (1971); Frankfurter, John Marshall and the Judicial Function, 69 HARV. L. Rev. 217
(1955).
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This interpretation is supported by the way that the Reconstruction Congress dealt with one intractable aspect of racial discrimination - segregation in the schools. Part V demonstrates that the
framers left this issue open for decision under the fourteenth amendment, and Part VI concludes the Article by comparing Plessy v. Ferguson and Brown on interpretivist grounds. Although Berger would
argue that P!essy is the strict construction and Brown the result of
judicial overreaching, in fact the evidence suggests that Brown's result was within the scope that the framers envisioned for the fourteenth amendment. Is
I.

THE TEXT: OF TERMS OF ART, RECEIVED MEANINGS, AND

SHADOW MEANINGS

Section 1 of the foµrteenth amendment provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. ~o State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of the citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process oflaw; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. I 6

Raoul Berger views the phrases "privileges or immunities," "due
process," and "equal protection of the laws" as terms of art to which
the framers attached "received meanings" virtually as specific as the
provision in article II limiting the Presidency to "natural born citizens" who "have attained the age of thirty five years."I 7 Berger
claims that section l's phrases limit one another and incorporate
only the meaning of the quite different phraseology of the 1866 Civil
Rights Act. I8 The three clauses of section 1, he argues, present
"three facets of one and the same concern:" All were designed to
15. Broader historical materials concerning, for example, the public controversy and legislative statements during ratification in the states, the private papers of the framers, and contemporaneous media coverage and commentary are beyond the scope of this Article.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. See R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 18-21, 35, 46, 51, 103-04, 169, 176, 180, 191.
18. See notes 1 & 17 supra. In contrast,§ 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act provides:
[A]ll persons born in the United States and not subject to any foreign Power, excluding
Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall have the same right, in every State and Territory in the United States, to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase,
lease, sell, hold and convey property, and to the full and equal benefit of all 1aws and
proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., app. 315 (1866).
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safeguard the freedmen from discrimination affecting a few basic
rights. The substance of those rights is provided by the privileges or
immunities clause, which was understood to refer to a narrow range
of fundamental values - personal security, the freedom to travel,
and the right to own property. 19 Under Berger's view, "equal protection" bars only racially partial state statutes that provide one of these
fundamental rights to whites but not to blacks, and the due process
clause merely affords the freedmen and their white sympathizers access to whatever judicial procedures a state chooses to establish to
hear claims arising under these rights. 20
Such propositions bear at least the same burden of persuasion
that Berger imposes on their kin, 21 the view that the phrases have
broad "shadow meanings," also generally accepted by the framers,
which derived from the language and natural rights philosophy
pressed by some evangelical abolitionists of the Ohio Western Reserve. Where Jacobus tenBroek and Howard Jay Graham trace section l's language back to those Western Reserve abolitionists who
rejected the positive law of slavery and racial caste under a "higher
law" theory, 22 Berger follows a similarly tortured path back to the
different "fundamental rights" of Blackstone. 23 In contrast to Berger's genealogy, however, section l's language was actually used by
the abolitionists, and their first principle - that a state must protect
all of its citizens to secure their allegiance - arguably appears on its
face. 24 This is not to suggest that section 1 has any generally agreed
and precise antecedents, but that its text may have many, sometimes
conflicting, sources. All of these sources played some part in the
long-running drama leading to the Reconstruction amendments;
19. R. BERGER, supra note l, at 36. These rights were supposedly enumerated in the 1866
Civil Rights Act and were "confiningly" defined by a single justice sitting in Circuit in Corfield
v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230), some 45 years earlier. See R. BER·
GER, supra note l, at 22, 30-32. Bui see J. ELY, supra note 6, at 23-30 nn.45, 58-59 & 64
(arguing that although the amendment's language does not compel that the provisions of the
bill of rights were to be counted among the "privileges or immunities" of citizens, nothing in
the language precludes such an interpretation); Soifer, supra note 7, at 670-75 (alleging that
Berger's selective quotations from Corjie/d tend to mask the inconsistencies in his theory of
limited fourteenth amendment rights).
20. R. BERGER, supra note l, at 18.
21. See id at 230-45.
22. See generally J. TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT (1951); Graham, The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment (pts. 1-2), 1950 Wis. L. REV. 479,610; tenBroek, ThirleenlhAmendmenl lo the Conslilulion
ofthe United Stales - Consummation lo Abolition and Key lo the Fourteenth Amendment, 39
CALIF. L. REV. 171 {1951).
23. See R. BERGER, supra note l, at 21.
24. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 22, at 15-29, 39-40, 54-56, 72-85, 94-110.
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none of them provided code words endorsed by a majority of either
the framers or the ratifying legislatures.
Wholly apart from the serious questions concerning the origins
and meaning of the privileges or immunities clause,25 Berger's construction of section 1 is far from strict. First, it requires substantial
revision of the syntax so that "due process" provides only a means of
redress for state deprivations of "privileges or immunities." As written, however, the two clauses are not dependent unless, as Berger
alleges, "life, liberty or property" is a proxy for "privileges or immunities." But this interpretation does not appear plausible on its face.
Concerning Berger's view that due process could mean no process,
moreover, the word "due" provides at least some hint that a minimum standard of procedural fairness is required before a state acts
in any way to deprive a person of "life, liberty or property."
Second, the syntax suggests that the guarantee of "equal protection of the laws" is separate from, and not limited to, "privileges or
immunities" and procedural fairness concerning "life, liberty or
property." By its terms, the equal protection clause imposes additional duties on the states, apart from the privileges or immunities
and due process clauses. The text does not limit the scope of "the
laws" to which "equal protection" applies. 26 In addition, the phrase
"deny to any person" provides a textual indication that section l's
final clause comprehends a state's failure to provide "equal protection of the laws," as well as a state's passage of racially discriminatory legislation or enforcement of a state-mandated caste system by
administrative, judicial, or local governmental action.27 Finally, the
25. See, e.g., J. TENBROEK, supra note 22, at 61-65, 72-85; Curtis, supra note 7, at 86-88;
Soifer,supra note 7, at 670-81; text at notes 57-80, 119-57, 191-96, 208-16 i'!fra. On its face, the
privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment speaks to rights "of the citizens
of the United States," not to rights "of citizens of each State" as defined by "the several States"
in article IV, § 2. The fourteenth amendment, by its terms, thus provides a guarantee of national rights, not comity for interstate travelers to those rights given by any state to its own
residents.
26. In an early brush with the reach of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court noted:
Its aim was against discrimination because of race or color. As we have said more than
once, its design was to protect an emancipated race, and to strike down all possible legal
discriminations against those who belong to it. . . . The 14th Amendment makes no attempt to enumerate the rights it designed to protect. It speaks in general terms, and those
are as comprehensive as possible.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879). To buttress this conclusion, the Court also
(a) tied the official exclusion of blacks from juries to deprivation of "an immunity from inequality oflegal protection, either for life, liberty, or property," 100 U.S. at 310, and (b) found a
denial of the "equal civil rights" guaranteed by the 1866 Civil Rights Act, as reenacted in 1870,
to "the full and equal benefit of all-laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens." 100 U.S. at 311-12.
27. The Court in 1880 struck down practices, as well as statutes, that excluded blacks from
jury service:
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equal protection and due process clauses protect "persons," while the
privileges or immunities clause applies only to "citizens." The three
clauses read as separate provisions; they do not limit one another to
their narrowest common denominator.
On its face, then, Berger's reading of section 1 amounts to a
transmogrification of the text. He asserts that section 1 only protects
blacks against racially discriminatory statutes affecting a narrow
range of personal and property rights. But this meaning does not
easily fit the text of section 1, and can be sustained only if one concludes that the framers failed to express their intent in plain English.28 Berger's reading is no more "strict" a construction than is the
theory that the text incorporates the beliefs of the Western Reserve
abolitionists.
At two points, Berger argues that the fourteenth amendment is
somewhat broader than his restrictive reading might otherwise suggest. First, he claims that section 1, by providing both national and
state citizenship to all persons in the United States, did more than
inter .Dred Scott's denial of national citizenship:
The Purpose of the Framers was to protect blacks from discrimination
with respect to specified "fundamental rights," enumerated in the Civil
Rights Act and epitomized in the . . . "privileges or immunities"
clause. To achieve that purpose, they made the black both a citizen "of
the United States and of the State in which he resides." 29

As a result, Berger criticizes Justice Miller's decision in the
Slaughterhouse Cases 30 for suggesting that the dual citizenship provision left citizens at the states' mercy for protection of all "privileges
or immunities," except for a list of national citizenship rights narrower than even Berger's reading of the framers' tastes. 31 But if one
(N)o agency of the State, or of the officers or agents by whom its powers are exerted, shall
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Whoever, by
virtue of public position under a state government, deprives another of property, life, or
liberty, without due process of law, or denies or takes away the equal protection of the
laws, violates the constitutional inhibition; and as he acts in the name and for the State,
and is clothed with the State's power, his act is that of the State.
Ex Parle Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880).
28. On the text alone, Berge(s view is no more plausible than Roscoe Conkling's dubious
claim that § I represented a conspiracy to protect corporations and big business from restraint
by the states. See J. JAMES, THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 194-97 (1958);
Graham, The Conspiracy Theory of the Fourteenth Amendment (pts. 1-2), 47 YALE L. J. 371
(1937), and 48 YALE L. J. 171 (1938).
29. R. BERGER, supra note l, at 46. See also C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIPS
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 51-66 (1969).
30. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
31. See R. BERGER, supra note l, at 37-51. See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 417-28 (1978). Some commentators have argued that the first sentence of§ 1
provides a broad guarantee of equal citizenship that cannot be understood as narrow or closed.
See, e.g., Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term - Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under The
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looks only at the text, Justice Miller's revision is no greater than Berger's. Miller reads the first sentence of section 1 to create state citizenship distinct from national citizenship; Berger reads the privileges
or immunities clause of the second sentence to limit the meaning of
the citizenship provided in the first. Berger's further limitation of
equal protection to laws concerning privileges or immunities falls beyond even this textual pale.
Berger also permits a broad interpretation of section 5. Citing
Laurent Frantz's reading of Reconstruction law, 32 he argues that section 5's grant of enforcement power "gave Congress implied power
to protect constitutional rights from interference by private individuals."33 But Frantz's theory also broadly interprets the fourteenth
amendment's substantive reach:
Where a racial group is discriminated against through a cultural pattern in which private acts play a part, the constitutional wrong, under
the fourteenth amendment, is not the act of the individual, but the failure of the state to take adequate steps to prevent it, or to redress it.34

Frantz's proposition is not confined to racially discriminatory legislation concerning seyeral enumerated "civil rights." It extends to
customary forms of discrimination that would subject blacks and
their white allies to race-dependent majoritarian abuse or neglect,
and it applies to state omissions and failures, as well as to state laws
imposing racial caste distinctions. Since Frantz's theory requires a
broad interpretation of the scope of rights protected under section 1,
Berger cannot logically endorse only his interpretation of congressional power over private discrimination under section 5.
The inconsistency in Berger's position on section 5 is not explained by his argument that the Reconstruction Congress was dominated by a "States' Rights" mentality.35 It is just as antithetical to
state sovereignty for Congress to regulate individual actions uponstate default as it is for Congress to act against any state's discriminatory legislation. Section l's second sentence - particularly the
equal protection clause - was intended by the framers to impose
antidiscrimination duties directly on the states.36 This represents a
FourteenlhAmendmenl, 91 HARV. L. REV. I (1977). But this reading offers too slippery a slope
for Berger. R. BERGER, supra note I, at 20-51.
32. See R. BERGER, supra note I, at 226-27, 224 n.23; Frantz, Congressional Power lo Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts, 73 YALE L.J. 1353 (1964). See also H.
FLACK, THE ADOPTION ~F THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 136-39 (1908, 1965 reprint).
33. R. BERGER, supra note I, at 226.
34. Frantz, supra note 32, at 1359.
35. See R. BERGER, supra note I, at 16-18, 60-64, 120, 124, 153-55.
36. See text at notes 70-81, 120-70, 176-200, 210-18 infra.
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considered view of federalism in which the states, in the first instance, must bear the responsibility to afford the equal protection of
the laws to all of their citizens.
Nor can Berger's broad reading of section 5 be explained by arguing that the framers feared that judicial review would narrow constitutional rights, or that they believed that only Congress could
make states respect their constitutional obligations. Section 1 imposed duties directly upon the states because the framers feared that
otherwise future Congresses might be free to repeal federal antidiscrimination legislation.37 The power of judicial review was
respected: Although the Court's pre-Civil War decisions protecting
the slave system still rankled, the Reconstruction Congress accepted
the power of the federal judiciary to review the constitutionality of
state conduct - a power that most thought inhered in the original
constitutional scheme.38 Indeed, some Reconstruction congressmen
noted with irony that the heavy hand of a Court that had so firmly
enforced slavery might now enforce just as firmly the states' new antidiscrimination duties. 39
The Reconstruction Congress, moreover, expanded federal court
jurisdiction to decide, first, cases arising under the 1866 Civil Rights
Act, then all civil rights claims, and, .finally, all federal questions. 40
In successive acts to enforce the Civil War amendments, Congress
granted the federal courts ever-wider jurisdiction to review discriminatory state action and default. With each new act, Congress expressed its increasing belief that state courts would not properly
decide civil rights cases. The key provisions of the 1871 Act, for example, contained no substantive standards, but provided aggrieved
persons with a cause of action in the federal courts for civil rights
claims arising under other federal laws, including section 1 of the
fourteenth amendment.41 Congressional intent to grant the federal
37. See text at notes 128-38, 150-55, 177-91, 209-18 iefra.
38. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); P. BATOR, P.
MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 439-70 (2d ed. 1973); THE FEDERALIST (A. Hamilton) No. 78; L. TRIBE,
supra note 31, at 9-12 & 11 n.7.
39. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (Rep. Wilson) & 1294 (Rep. Shellabarger) (1867).
40. Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1343); Act of
Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1343); Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114,
§ 3, 18 Stat. 335 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331). Section 10 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act also
specifically provided "that upon all questions of law arising in any cause under the provisions
of this act a final appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court of the United States." CoNo.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., app. 316.
41. See,e.g., Great Am. Sav. & Loan Assn. v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1979); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617-20 (1979).
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courts power to interpret section I is also indicated by contemporaneous legislation designed to divest the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of the federally imposed military
governments in the rebel states.42 Thus, the framers gave the federal
judiciary extensive authority to police state compliance with section
I and the ensuing enforcement acts.
This is not to suggest that the enforcement power vested in Congress by section 5 is mere surplusage. To the contrary, Laurent
Frantz makes a compelling argument that section 5 empowers Congress to provide that antidiscrimination protection "which the state
has failed to provide."43 But the framers, whatever their misgivings,
accepted and explicitly augmented the power of the federal judiciary
to measure challenged state action and inaction against the duties
imposed by the equal protection clause.44 What emerges from the
language and structure of sections I and 5 and the enforcement acts
is a considered view of federalism, not unfettered respect for states'
rights. The states bear primary responsibility for the amendment's
implementation, but the extent of state compliance in specific cases is
subject to federal judicial review, and state defaults may result in
more sweeping congressional reform and regulation.
Section 1, however, leaves open the nature and reach of the
states' antidiscrimination duties. On this issue, the section's language and structure provide no more support for Berger's restrictive
"received meanings" than for the expansive "shadow meanings" that
he condemns.45 On the basis of the amendment's language alone,
42. See Ex Parle Mccardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869); 15 Stat. 44. See generally C.
FAIRMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88 (Pt. l) (6 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT) 433-514 (1971).
43. Frantz, supra note 32, at 1359:
But this power exists only when the state fails to do its duty . . . . Congress may [also]
provide in advance for a possible violation. But, if it does so, such legislation must be
made conditional on the state's failure to act . . . . Congressional legislation which impinges directly on the conduct of private individuals and which operates un!formly regardless efthe role played by the state is unconstitutional. But this is not because "private acts"
are beyond the limits of congressional power. Rather it is because: (a) Congress may not
presume that states will fail to discharge their constitutional duties; [and] (b) Congress
may not deprive the states, in advance of any default on their part, of the very function
the amendment co=ands them to perform.
Id. (emphasis in original).
44. Berger accepts the power of judicial review by the Supreme Court - "policing the
boundaries" of the Constitution - as the issue arises in cases or controversies in order to
decide the "Supreme Law of the Land." See R. BERGER, supra note l, at 351-62. Cf. R.
BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT (1969). But he argues against any ''.judicial enforcement of the [Fourteenth] Amendment." R. BERGER, supra note l, at 229. The real issue,
then, is not the propriety ofjudicial review under the amendment, but the nature and extent of
the duties directly imposed on the states by § I, which the Court must interpret whenever it
reviews challenged state action and default.
45. See BERGER, supra note I, at 230-45; J. ELY, supra note 6, at 198-200 n.66.
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therefore, Berger cannot meet his burden of proof. Section 1, particularly the equal protection clause, does not appear calculated to provide literal, let alone restrictive, answers to any specific questions. 46
Its language does not "partake of the prolixity of the legal code,"47
but is constitutional in its open-endedness and generality.48 Unless
the equal protection clause uses code words having precise.meanings
generally accepted by both the framers and the ratifying legislatures,
therefore, it cannot fairly be interpreted as having a specific, narrow
meaning in the 186Os, binding for all time.
II.

THE OBJECTS OF RECONSTRUCTION REDRESS

"[T]he sorts of evils against which the provision was directed"49
and its "important objects"50 shed light on the purpose of Reconstruction law generally and the equal protection clause in particular.
Contemporaneous conditions provide the context for Reconstruction
redress and "may have shaped the purposes of the actual Framers."51 Decades or centuries after the fact, it is difficult to determine
what current conditions closely resemble the historic wrongs that
may have led to the passage of a given provision. And subsequent
events, experiences, and values may further complicate current understanding of the nature of the important objects originally addressed. 52 Nevertheless, the sorts of evils that the framers sought to
redress after the Civil War provide another clue to the original understanding of the scope of Reconstruction law. A brief examination
of the context in which the fourteenth amendment arose indicates
that it was not directed solely at state legislation that was expressly
46. In contrast, Berger's argument that the framers did not intend § l to grant the suffrage
to blacks does have support in the text and structure of the fourteenth amendment. Section 2
provides that representatives shall be apportioned according to their population, except when a
state "denies or abridges" the right of any "male inhabitant" at least 21 years of age to vote. In
that event, § 2 provides that the basis of representation of such state "shall be reduced in the
proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male
citizens twenty-one years of age." Section 2 is literal, not vague; specific, not general. There is
no need to resort to "terms of art," "received meanings," or "shadow meanings." In the context of contemporary black disenfranchisement in many (but not all) states, and the Republicans fear of Democratic control in many Southern states, its meaning can be inferred unless
§ 2 is to be read as senseless surplusage. (Whether this exclusion of black suffrage impliedly
removed all other ''voting" and apportionment issues from the reach of§ l is beyond the scope
of this Article, but the answer is not self-evident.)
47. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
48. See A. BICKEL, supra note 5, at 105-06.
49. J. ELY, supra note 6, at 13.
50. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819); Sandalow, supra note 5, at
1036.
51. A. BICKEL, supra note 5, at 98.
52. See Sandalow, supra note 5, at 1064-68.
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partial concerning certain limited rights; rather, it was also intended
to strike at discriminatory implementation of facially neutral laws,
and at the states' failure to protect blacks from pervasive private
discrimination.
The passage of the thirteenth amendment, which outlawed the
institution of slavery, and the end of the Civil War set the stage for
the, developments leading to the fourteenth amendment. It is undisputed that slavery was more than a formal legal status; it involved a
complex system of state laws and local ordinances (or "Slave
Codes"), executive and judicial enforcement, community custom,
and private action. 53 The slave states also enforced a reciprocal system of discrimination to subjugate the "free blacks" in their midst,
lest they serve as a festering symbol of freedom constantly threatening the slave regime.54 Whether the legislative history shows that the
framers intended "full freedom" as a necessary corollary of the abolition of slavery, for both historically "free blacks" and emancipated
slaves alike, is still debated.55 Many proponents of the thirteenth
amendment argued (and many of its opponents feared) that it should
be construed broadly.56 Others declared that it outlawed only the
status of slavery and left the rest, including the framework of customary caste subjugation of blacks, to the states for decision.57
Under either view, there remained the problem of defining what acts
of racial discrimination - whether public, customary, or private amounted to such "badges and incidents of slavery"58 that they perpetuated conditions of servitude under section 1 or supported legislation by Congress under section 2 to enforce the prohibition against
53. See, e.g., J. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (3d ed. 1967); L. HIGGINBOTHAM, IN THE MATTER OF COLOR (1978).
54. See I. BERLIN, SLAVES WITHOUT MASTERS (1974). Many free states, of course, also
imposed caste distinctions to exclude blacks altogether or to keep blacks in a second-class
condition. See L. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY (1961).
55. Compare tenBroek, supra note 22, at 179-81, with C. FAIRMAN, supra note 42, at 113459.
56. For example, Senator Wilson, a proponent, declared:
If this amendment shall be incorporated by the will of the nation into the Constitution of
the United States, it will obliterate the last lingering vestiges of the slave system; its chattelizing, degrading, and bloody codes; its dark, malignant, barbarizing spirit; all it was and
is, everything connected with it or penaining to it.
CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 1324 (1865). Rep. Rogers, an opponent, warned that traditional state subjects of marital and parental relations, suffrage, contracts, and the like would be
"interfered with, abolished, and annulled." Id at 151.
57. CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1459-65 (1864) (remarks of Senator Henderson, a
Democratic proponent of the thineenth amendment).
58. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1866) ("With the destruction of slavery
necessarily follows the destruction of the incidents to slavery . . . [and] all badges of servitude.
• . ."); id at 319-23, 474 (subsequent remarks of Senator Trumbull on the meaning of the
thirteenth amendment).
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slavery. 59 Unless the thirteenth amendment was intended by its
framers to be a vain act, its object of redress must have included
something more than the formal legal status of slavery and the Slave
Codes.
Contemporary understanding of the thirteenth amendment thus
may shed some light on the background leading to consideration of
the fourteenth. Yet Berger barely addresses the relevance of the thirteenth amendment. 60 In contrast, Berger argues that the fourteenth
amendment merely "constitutionalized" the 1866 Civil Rights Act. 61
Therefore, the following discussion turns to the sorts of evils which
that Act was intended to remedy.
At the end of the Civil War, the rebel states sought to preserve
their racial caste systems. When restructuring their civil governments, these states formed legislatures dominated by conservatives.
In the winter of 1865-1866, all but Texas enacted Black Codes to
keep the "free" blacks in a second-class position, beneath both their
former masters and poor whites. Many of the Codes expressly excluded blacks from voting, owning land, making contracts, securing
access to the courts, working without a license, traveling without a
pass, or engaging in certain trades. 62
Other provisions, however, made no reference to race; instead,
their oppressive racial impact depended on selective enforcement,
customary caste relations, and private discrimination against
blacks. 63 The invidious quality of these laws lay in their failure to
protect blacks from the white majority's efforts to maintain blacks as
a servile class. Many of the vagrancy and apprenticeship laws, for
example, applied on their face to blacks and whites alike, but none59. Compare, e.g., Runyon v. Mccrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976) (§ 1981 prohibits private, commercially operated school from denying admission for reasons of race), and Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (§ 1982 prohibits racial discrimination in sales and rentals of
property), with Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883).
60. Whatever the meaning of the debates, even Fairman counsels that the thirteenth
amendment did signal a profound revolution in the federal system. "It was not merely authority to disallow State action found to contravene the prohibition: it was a power actually to
interfere in order to bar the proscribed relationship between persons. To State rights dogmatists, this shattered the premise which they regarded as fundamental to the Union." C. FAIR·
MAN,supra note 42, at 1156. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2939 (Rep. Pruyn),
2991 (Rep. Randall) (1864).
61. R. BERGER, supra note I, at 22-23.
62. Howard, Laws in Relation to the Freedmen, 1 S. EXEC. Doc. No. 6, 39th Cong., 2d Sess.
170-230 (1867).
63. See, e.g., 1 S. EXEC. Doc. No. 6, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 170-71 (Alabama -vagrancy),
180-81 (Georgia - apprentices), 181-83 (Louisiana - labor contracts for agricultural pursuits), 184-85 (Louisiana - vagrancy), 186 (Louisiana - apprentices and indentured servants), 218-19 (South Carolina - vagrancy), 229-30 (Virginia - vagrancy) (1867).
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theless threatened to relegate blacks to virtual peonage. Whites refused to convey land to blacks or to employ "free" blacks at a living
wage, and the laws imposed harsh penalties on those hapless victims,
predominantly black, who could .find neither land to till nor paying
jobs at which to work. 64 Federal military commanders in Virginia,
South Carolina, Alabama, and Mississippi quashed such facially
race-neutral acts. In the face of "combinations by [white] employers" leading to inadequate wages for blacks throughout the states,
these Reconstruction generals found that the laws would "reduce the
freedmen to a condition of servitude worse than that from which
they have been emancipated - a condition which will be slavery in
all but its name."65
Raoul Berger agrees that section 1 of the 1866 Civil Rights Act
"was a studied response to a perceived evil, the Black Codes." 66 Yet
by ignoring the significance of the Codes' facially neutral provisions,
he fails to recognize the sweep of the evil that the 1866 Act addressed. When advocating the Act, Senator Wilson noted that the
facially neutral Virginia vagrancy law had been "used to make
slaves of men whom we have made free," and stated that it was
"nearly as iniquitous as the old slave codes that darkened the legislation of other days." 67 Senator Trumbull recited with approval the
military commanders' .findings concerning the oppressive impact of
the vagrancy laws.68 And in the House debate over the Act, Representative Cook inveighed against the discriminatory effects of
facially neutral laws:
The question is, shall we leave these men in this condition? It is idle to
say we are not leaving them to a system of slavery. If it had not been
for the acts of the military commanders, had not the laws which have
already been enacted by the Legislatures of the rebel States been set
aside, the Negroes would all have been slaves now under the operation
of their vagrant acts or other laws.
I believe this bill is a proper remedy for these evils.69
64. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. Pt. 2, 55, 83, 235-36, Part III, 9, 22, 36, 71, Part IV, 56, 69, 82 (1866); REPORT OF GENERAL CARL SCHURZ ON THE STATES OF SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA, ALABAMA, MISSISSIPPI,
AND LOUISIANA, I s. EXEC. Doc. No. 2, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 22, 24-25, 82 (1865); J. TENBROEK, supra note 22, at 163-64.
65. Quoted in E. McPHERSON, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA DURING THE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION 42 (1871). See generally id at 37.
66. R. BERGER, supra note I, at 25.
67. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 603 (1866).
68. Id at 1759. See id at 474.
69. Id at 1124. See id at I 153 (Rep. Thayer), I 160 (Rep. Windom), 1263 (Rep.
Broomall). Sections 7 and 8 of the contemporaneous Freedman's Bureau Bill, although falling
initially to President Johnson's veto, had similar objects. See, e.g., id at 322 (Sen. Trumbull),
365 (Sen. Fessenden), 588 (Sen. Donnelly) (1866).
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If eliminating race-neutral but oppressive acts was one object of
the 1866 Act, its goals were not as "limited" as Berger claims. 70
Based on the sorts of evil addressed, the Act can be understood as
limited to "discriminatory legislation with respect to specified
rights" 71 only if (a) these rights included the terms and conditions of
employment, the opportunity to lead a productive life in a chosen
profession, and freedom from racially disparate punishments for
conditions of racial inequality caused by the legacy of slavery and
continuing prejudice, and (b) the discrimination included facially
neutral laws that failed to redress private combinations and other
customary discriminations.72 This sort of evil included a state's denial of protection to blacks by the passage of penal or regulatory
laws that ignored customary discrimination and thus relegated
blacks to second-class citizenship. 73
The 1866 Civil Rights Act dealt with the specific wrongs that
Congress thought should be outlawed at that time. The underlying
evil that Congress attacked was the legacy of slavery - invidious
racial discrimination. The legislation was directed at the ways in
which this evil was manifested most harshly in 1866.74 Decades or
centuries later, however, the manifestations of such discrimination
might be quite different. Unless the framers believed that time
would stand still, they might have foreseen that the future would
bring such changes. Thus, even an amendment incorporating "only"
the thrust of the 1866 Act could authorize different applications than
those enumerated in the Act. 75
This brings us to the sorts of evils sought to be remedied by the
70. R. BERGER, supra note I, at 27.
71. Id at 47.
72. See also J. ELY, supra note 6, at 28-31, 198 n.64; Soifer, supra note 7, at 670-81.
73. This principle of the state's affirmative duty to provide protection to its citizens to
secure their allegiance finds considerable support in the debates on the Civil Rights Act and
the Freedmen's Bureau Bill. See, e.g., CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., !st Sess. 77 (Sen. Trumbull), 833 (Sen. Clark) (1865). It is also the first "fundamental principle" recognized by Justice
Washington in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230), as a
"privilege" of citizenship und~r the comity clause. See note 195 iefra.
74. As a result, the 1866 Civil Rights Act partakes of the prolixity ofa legal code; and the
statements of its proponents (often in response to conservative charges) that segregation in
schools, exclusion of blacks from juries and voting, and miscegenation were not intended to be
covered are consistent with the particular objects enumerated in the Act and the deletion of a
clause providing "no discrimination in civil rights." See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., Isl
Sess. 322, 599, 606 (Sen. Trumbull), 1117 (Rep. Wilson) (1866). But cf. id. at 477-78 (Sen.
Saulsbury), 457 (Rep. Kasson), app. 183 (Sen. Davis) (somewhat different reading by the conservative opponents). The nature of Bingham's reading of the phrase "civil rights" and his
opposition to the 1866 Civil Rights Act are discussed in the text at notes 120-47 iefra.
15. See Bickel, supra note 9, 69 HARV. L. REV. at 56-65; Sandalow, supra note 5, at 103637.
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fourteenth amendment. For Raoul Berger, the answer is the same
object as the 1866 Act, which he argues was aimed only at expressly
racially discriminatory legislation affecting certain rights. 76 Yet the
1866 Act responded to evils extending beyond such express discrimination. The language of the fourteenth amendment, moreover, is
markedly different from that of the Act: it is more general and openended. There can be no question that at least one object of the
amendment was to constitutionalize the 1866 Act, both to prevent its
repeal by a hostile future Congress and to resolve any doubts concerning Congress's power to pass the 1866 Act under the thirteenth
amendment.77 In so doing, however, the framers consciously used
broad language that is not a mere substitute for the 1866 Act.78
Part IV of this Article reviews the relatively sparse legislative debate on section 1 in light of Berger's claim that the fourteenth
amendment's framers nevertheless intended just such a substitute.
The inquiry here is limited to determining the evils that Congress
sought to redress in the fourteenth amendment. The Black Codes
and the system of racial subjugation that they symbolized again provide one starting point. The Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction that drafted the fourteenth amendment and presented it to
Congress reported extensively on the evils of these Black Codes.
The Report did not ignore facially neutral laws that operated in
practice to oppress blacks.79 In addition, the Report stressed thefailure of the states to protect against continuing community bias and
private intimidation:
The feeling in many portions of the country towards emancipated
slaves, especially among the uneducated and ignorant, is one of vindictive and malicious hatred. This deep-seated prejudice against color is
assiduously cultivated by the public journals, and leads to acts of cruelty, oppression and murder, which the local authorities are at no pains
to prevent or punish. so

Section I was designed to redress this denial by the states of the
16. See R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 25-27, 47, 168-92, 203, 213.
77. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2349 (Rep. Stevens), 2498-500 (Rep.
Broomall), 2511-12 (Rep. Eliot) (1866).
78. The opponents of the fourteenth amendment complained at length about the risk of
expansive "construction" of§ 1 and its open-ended phrasing - save for the specific exclusion
of Negro suffrage by § 2 - compared to the 1866 Civil Rights Act. See, e.g., id at 2466 (Rep.
Boyer), 2530 (Rep. Randall), 3041 (Sen. Johnson), app. 240 (Sen. Davis). In contrast to the
1866 Act debates, the proponents responded only with generality, not enumeration of covered
and omitted subjects or deletion of comprehensive coverage. See text at notes 186-91, 214-17
infra.
19. See note 64supra.
80. REPORT OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON RECONSTRUCTION, 2 H.R. REP. No. 30, 39th
Cong., 1st Sess. XVII (1866).
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equal protection of their laws. 81 How the duty to protect against this
evil would be measured, policed, and enforced in the future could
not be known in 1866.
Following the passage of the fourteenth amendment in Congress,
a flood of remedial legislation was enacted to bring the rebel states
up short and to protect blacks and their white (i.e., Republican) sympathizers. In July 1866, Congress finally succeeded in passing the
Freedmen's Bureau Bill over President Johnson's second veto. 82 The
Bill guaranteed civil rights (as defined in the 1866 Civil Rights Act)
for all persons in the rebel states, extended military jurisdiction for
their protection, and continued the affirmative relief efforts designed
to uplift the freedmen from conditions of servitude, poverty, and ignorance. To remedy the continuing discrimination and violence directed at blacks and white Republicans, Congress then enacted the
Military Reconstruction Act in March 1867. It substituted federal
military rule for the recalcitrant civil governments in ten rebel states.
The Act also compelled these states to ratify the fourteenth amendment and to adopt new constitutions guaranteeing suffrage to blacks
as a condition of restoration to the Union. 83
In 1869, the Reconstruction Congress passed the fifteenth amendment to ensure that the right to vote could not be "denied or
abridged on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude" and to grant Congress the power to enforce this right by appropriate legislation. Thereafter, in 1870, 1871, and 1875, Congress
passed ever more sweeping enforcement acts. In the face of the
Southern states' failure to suppress Klan harassment, intimidation,
and murder, the 1870 Act sought to eliminate such interference with
the suffrage. 84 It also re-enacted the 1866 Civil Rights Act pursuant
to the fourteenth amendment. The Force Act of 1871 supplemented
81. Sections 3 and 4 of the fourteenth amendment also established particular means to
cement Union supremacy against the resurrection of many Confederate leaders in the newly
reforming state governments of the South. Section 3 disabled these leaders of "insurrection or
rebellion" from holding office. Section 4 declared void the Confederate debt and barred any
state from paying it.
82. CONG. GLOBE,.39th Cong., 1st Sess., app. 366-67 (1866).
83. Ch. 153, 14 Stat. 428 (1867).
84. Act of May 3 I, 1870, ch. ll4, 16 Stat. 140. This Act passed over conservative objections that the states retained the exclusive power to remedy any "private" abuses of the right to
vote and that the fifteenth amendment gave Congress no authority to correct the "supposed
shortcomings of the State." CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., app. 473 (Sen. Casserly)
(1870). The Reconstruction Congress was apparently convinced that a state could "deny" the
right to vote by "acts of omission," including the failure to protect against Klan harassment,
and that the "United States Government" had "the duty ... to supply that omission, and by
its own laws and by its own courts to go into the States for the purpose of giving the Amendment vitality there." Id. at 3611 (Sen. Pool).
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this protection with federal supervision of all congressional elections
throughout the country.8 s
The Civil Rights Act of 1871 was dubbed the Ku Klux Klan Act:
It authorized federal civil, criminal, and executive redress for the
states' failure to protect the private lives and community affairs of
Republicans and the freedmen from rule by Klan terror. 86 Representative Perry of Ohio described the evil at issue:
Where these gangs of [Klan] assassins show themselves the rest of the
people look on, if not with sympathy, at least with forbearance. . . .
Sheriffs, having eyes to see, see not; judges, having ears to hear, hear
not. ... In the presence of these gangs all the apparatus and machinery of civil government, all the processes of justice, skulk away as if
government and justice were crimes and feared detection. . . . [The
fourteenth amendment] means, then, that the people of a State, with
more or less definite political and governmental relations, shall neither
abridge nor permit to be abridged those rights, deny nor fail to afford
the equal protection of the laws to any persons. 87
Ohio Representative Stevenson continued:
Unexecuted laws are no "protection." And this brings us to the very
case: the States have laws providing for equal protection, but they do
not, because either they will not or cannot, enforce them equally; and
hence a class of citizens have not "the protection of the laws." Union
men, white and black, are "denied" the protection of the laws as completely as if the laws excepted from their operation "all cases of outrage
by Ku Klux upon Republicans, white or colored." 88
Senator Edmunds, floor manager of the Bill, concluded:
[I]t has been the recognized and bounden duty of all courts, and of all
executive officers intrusted with the administration of justice and the
law, to give that which the citizen was entitled to, to execute justice and
a/ford protection against all forms of wrong and oppression. Why, sir,
[that] has [always] blazed on the forehead of constitutional liberty. 89
In response to conservative charges that the 1871 Act would intrude
85. Ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433. Citing "Kuklux outrages" and "enormous frauds . . . perpetrated
on the ballot box," Ohio Representative Lawrence remarked:
(W]e know that the State laws have not protected the citizens of the southern States
against violence, and have not protected the citizens against fraud and force and wrong in
more than one of the cities of the northern States. And if the States have failed to enact
laws necessary to secure what we all, I trust, have so much at heart, to wit, the purity of
the ballot-box, or have failed to execute those already enacted, then it is the highest duty
of this Congress to intervene and protect the citizens of the United States.
CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 1276 (1871).
86. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13.
87. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 78, 80 (1871).
88. Id at 300. See also id at 334 (Rep. Hoar), 367-68 (Rep. Sheldon), 375 (Rep. Lowe),
428-29 (Rep. Beatty), 459-60 (Rep. Coburn), 482 (Rep. Wilson), 514 (Rep. Poland), 608 (Rep.
Pool), app. 68, 71, 116-17 (Rep. Shellabarger), app. 72 (Rep. Blair), app. 85 (Rep. Bingham),
app. 147 (Rep. Shanks), app. 153 (Rep. Garfield), app. 182 (Rep.Mercur).
89. Id at 697 (emphasis added).
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on the "sovereignty" reserved to the states, Edmunds cited the limitations and duties directly imposed on the states by the fourteenth
amendment and scoffed: "Why, sir, if I were in any other place I
should say - 'O Shame, where is thy blush?' " 90
In 1875, the Reconstruction Congress passed its last enforcement
act. 91 The subsequent legal controversy over the 1875 Act relates
primarily to the form and object of its remedial sanctions. The Act
imposed antidiscrimination duties and penalties directly on individuals, in the supposed absence of a clear state default, 92 rather than
on the public officials who failed to protect blacks against customary
discrimination in facilities generally open to all comers. 93 Once
again,. the evil sought to be redressed was the states'failure to protect
blacks against systematic private discrimination by refusing to enforce the common law concerning access to public accommodations,
common carriers, and other community facilities for the benefit of
blacks and whites alike - the states' failure to provide "equal protection of the laws." 94
Thus, in the years immediately after the adoption of the four90. Id
91. Act of Mar. l, 1875, ch. 114, pt. 3, 18 Stat. 336.
92. See Frantz, supra note 32, at 1359, 1379-84.
93. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
94. See, e.g., 2 CONG. REC. 340 (Rep. Butler), 383 (Rep. Ransier), 408 (Rep. Elliott), 41214 (Rep. Lawrence), 416 (Rep. Walls), 455-57 (Rep. Butler), 940 (Rep. Butler). See generally
H. FLACK, supra note 32, at 210-77, for another discussion of congressional interpretation of
the amendment during Reconstruction. Berger's subsequent attempt to buttress his original
understanding of the fourteenth amendment selects only certain parts of the mass of congressional action and argument during Reconstruction and ignores others. See Berger, supra note
8. Consider one example: Berger cites Representative Garfield's historical dispute with Representative Bingham as evidence that the scope of the privileges or immunities clause was
limited to the rights enumerated in the 1866 Civil Rights Act rather than to H.R. 63. Id at
341-42, & 345 n.217 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 151 (1871)). But Berger
does not address Bingham's view of this dispute, see, e.g., text at notes 145, 161-64 i,!fra, nor
does he consider that, beneath the verbal dispute about H.R. 63, Bingham and Garfield may
have had a fairly similar, balanced view offederalism, including affirmative state duties under
the equal protection clause. See text at notes 106-68 i,!fra. In particular, Berger omits discussion of the broad reading of the equal protection clause invoked by Garfield in the next breath
to support passage of the 1871 Civil Rights Act. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 153
(1871):
This thought [ie., the equal protection clause] was never before in the constitution, either
in form or in substance. . . . It is a broad and comprehensive limitation on the power of
the State governments, and, without doubt, Congress is empowered to enforce this limitation by any appropriate legislation. . . . [I]t restrains the States from making or enforcing laws which are not on their face and in their provisions of equal application to all the
citizens of the State. . . . I think the provision that the States shall not "deny the equal
protection of the laws" implies that they shall afford equal protection. . . . [E]ven where
[state] laws are just and equal on their face, yet, by a systematic maladministration of
them, or a neglect or refusal to enforce their provisions, a portion of the people are denied
equal protection under them.
See also note 88 supra, text at notes 180-82 i,!fra.
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teenth amendment, the Congressmen who framed its language acted
with the understanding that it covered a broad range of state behavior. The evils addressed by the constitutional amendments and the
acts of the Reconstruction Congress extended beyond racially discriminatory state statutes that affected limited rights concerning the
security of person and property. Congress regulated state executive,
judicial, and local governmental action to protect the freedmen and
other citizens against a new form of white supremacy rooted in private conspiracy and intimidation, fueled by Democratic opposition
to Republican Reconstruction and by community hostility to blacks,
and condoned by state default, official blindness, and public disregard of minority interests. The Reconstruction Congress did not, of
course, address every form of caste discrimination authorized, condoned, or neglected by the states in all of their branches and subdivisions. But it did serve notice, consistent with the text of the
fourteenth amendment, that the states' affirmative duty to provide
"equal protection of the laws" to the freedmen could be interpreted
broadly, applied to a variety of state action and inaction, subjected
to judicial review, and supplemented with remedial regulation by
Congress. But this open-ended quality also left open both the ultimate status of the free blacks and the final fate of caste discrimination and race relations throughout the country.

111.

JOHN BINGHAM AND THE FRAMING OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT: CODE WORDS OR GENERALITY?

All commentators credit John Bingham, a Republican Representative from Ohio and member of the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, with finally framing the fourteenth amendment after the
Joint Committee rebuffed several of his earlier proposals. His hand
(and seemingly indefatigable willingness to submit draft after draft)
shaped the critical text and structure of sections 1 and 5. Beyond
that, little is known about him. There are no published biographies
and the one unpublished dissertation sketchily covers only his upbringing and political career before the Civil War.95 Yet commentators credit Bingham with a variety of purposes. Graham and
tenBroek see him as the vessel through which fl.owed the natural
rights philosophy of the evangelical abolitionists.96 Berger views
Bingham as a Negrophobe whose objections to the "no discrimina95. C. Riggs, The Ante-Bel/um Career of John A. Bingham (December 1958) (Unpublished
Doctoral Dissertation, New York University).
96. See, e.g., J. TENBROEK, supra note 22, at 125-28; Graham, supra note 22, at 610; Graham, Our "JJeclarato,y" Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1954).
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tion in civil rights" clause of the 1866 Civil Rights Act confirm the
narrowest reading of the fourteenth amendment.97 Fairman calls
Bingham an incurably muddle-headed thinker, an "ardent rhetorician, not a man of exact knowledge or clear conceptions or accurate
language," 98 whose "utterances cannot be accepted as serious propositions."99 Such wide-ranging views of Bingham should provoke
skepticism toward any claim that Bingham framed the fourteenth
amendment as a code to be interpreted as a term of art.
Bingham grew up in Mercer, Pennsylvania, and Cadiz, Ohio, attended Franklin College in Athens, Ohio, and finally settled to apprentice and practice law and Whig politics, first in Cadiz and then
in New Philadelphia, Ohio. From what little is known about his
early life, it appears that he may have been exposed to the natural
rights philosophy of the Western Reserve Abolitionists, who argued
that the Constitution (despite the contrary decisions of the courts) 100
outlawed slavery, guaranteed citizenship to blacks, and prohibited
caste discrimination against free blacks. 101 But this ethic did not
dominate these communities, and there is no direct evidence that
Bingham either adopted the principles of the Western Reserve or
rejected them in favor of the alternative abolitionist view that the
Constitution was a pact with slavery whose only salvation was substantial rewriting or revolution. As a Whig party chairman and
county prosecutor, however, Bingham probably supported the
planks adopted in 1846 by Northern Ohio Whig leaders opposing
the extension of slavery beyond the South and arguing for repeal of
Ohio's Black Laws. 102
Bingham frequently displayed his ability to act as a politician by
supporting result over principle and by bending his goals to suit his
immediate needs. For example, despite his opposition to the expansion of slavery and his desire to repeal Ohio's Black Laws, Bingham
supported the nomination of Zachary Taylor in 1848 over the protests of Whig abolitionists, and he opposed their formation of a Free
Soil Party. 103 Shortly thereafter, Bingham moved to Cincinnati, a
conservative stronghold on race issues, and urged compromise on
97. R. BERGER, supra note 1, at 119-23; Berger, The Scope ofJudicial Review: An Ongoing
JJebate, 6 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 527, 551 (1979).
98. C. FAIRMAN, supra note 42, at 462.
99. Id at 1289.
100. See generally R. COVER, supra note 53 (discussing the judiciary's failure to outlaw
slavery before the Civil War).
IOI. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 22, at 125-28; C. Riggs, supra note 95.
102. See C. Riggs, supra note 95, at 48-50.
103. See id at 61-79.
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the slavery issue and obedience to the congressional legislation of
1850, including the Fugitive Slave Act. 104 When he returned to his
home in more liberal Northern Ohio, however, he again denounced
slavery, opposed its expansion, and urged repeal of the Fugitive
Slave Act. 105
In 1854, Bingham turned toward the Western Reserve philosophy. He joined a new "anti-Nebraska" party, which condemned
slavery in general and the Kansas-Nebraska Act in particular, and
won a seat in Congress on the rising tide of antislavery sentiment.
He argued that slavery was contrary to the liberty and justice guaranteed by the Constitution and thus could not be extended by congressional act or local legislation into the territories. 106 Bingham
soon joined the new Republican party and flayed "slavocracy" at
every tum. 107 His mentor in the House became Joshua Giddings, a
long-time abolitionist from the Western Reserve. Undaunted by
contrary judicial interpretations, Bingham argued that slavery conflicted with natural law, the Declaration of Independence, the preamble to the Constitution, and the provisions guaranteeing a
Republican form of government, liberty, and due process. He believed, therefore, that the territorial legislatures lacked authority to
pass laws abridging these rights. 108 The "horrid crime of slavery"
may have been written into the Constitution for the original thirteen
states, but for Bingham the Constitution's implicit guarantees of
"equal protection" and "liberty" to all persons, including blacks,
were incompatible with the creation of new chattel systems elsewhere.109
Chief Justice Taney responded to views like Bingham's in .Dred
Scott v. Sanford, 110 where he declared that slaves were prop-erty, not
persons. He interpreted the fifth amendment's "due process" clause
to mean that Congress could not deprive masters of their slave property.111 Bingham joined fellow Republicans in opposing the .Dred
Scott decision. 112 He challenged Taney's assertion that blacks were
104. See id at 87-88.
105. See id at 103.
106. See id at 121-22.
107. See id at 134-36.
108. CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess., app. 122-26 (1856), discussed in C. Riggs, supra
note 95, at 154-59. See CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 1st Sess. 222 (1856).
109. See CONG. GLOBE, 34th Cong., 3d Sess., app. 135-40 (1857), discussed in C. Riggs,
supra note 95, at 195-207. Bingham's views were not unique; they were included in the Republican platform of 1856. 1 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 27 (D. Johnson, ed. 1978).
110. 60 U.S. 393 (1857).
111. 60 U.S. at 450-52.
112. See C. Riggs, supra note 95, at 218-20.
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inferior beings without any rights or privileges under the Constitution, 113 and he spoke against the proposed denial of the right of free
blacks to live in Kansas. 114
In 1859, Bingham opposed the admission of Oregon into the
Union because of similar racial restrictions. He declared that limitations on travel, ownership of property, and access to the courts deprived blacks of the "privileges and immunities" of national
citizenship. Taking aim at Taney's holding in Dred Scott, Bingham
argued that "all free persons born and domiciled within the United
States - not all free white persons, but all free persons" - are "citizens" of the United States.m He cited the equal rights of free blacks
in many states when the nation was first formed, and argued that
Oregon had a duty to provide free blacks, like all other citizens, with
"due protection" of all natural rights. Although Bingham stated at
this time that the franchise was not a "natural right," he argued that
the states should nevertheless extend political privileges - so far as
consistent with the stability of good government - to the largest
possible number of citizens. 116
After President Lincoln's election, Bingham opposed any compromise with the South on slavery. He argued again for full constitutional rights for all citizens and persons and for the duty of all
states to provide equal protection and due process. 117 In 1862, when
supporting a bill to emancipate slaves in the District of Columbia,
Bingham repeated his claim that free blacks were citizens entitled to
due process oflaw and state protection of their privileges or immunities, life, liberty, and property. Although he again conceded that suffrage was a matter for the states to decide, he did not defend his
home state's denial of the vote. 118 Instead, he noted that blacks had
voted freely in many states in 1789, and praised Massachusetts for
holding to her "ancient faith that rights, even political rights, are
inseparable from manhood and citizenship, and in no wise dependent upon complexion or the accident of birth." 119
The view of the Constitution that Bingham endorsed was not
commonly accepted. It was rejected in Dred Scott, and was contrary
to the view that the fifth amendment's due process clause (with the
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 1st Sess. 399-402 (1858).

Id at 1864-66.
CONG. GLOBE, 35th Cong., 2d Sess. 984 (1859).

Id at 981-85.
CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 2d Sess., app. 82-84 (1861).
CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. 163~-40 (1862).
Id at 1639.
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exception of slavery) applied to procedure, not substance, and limited Congress, not the states. Furthermore, the "privileges and immunities" mentioned in the comity clause of article IV, section 2,
had not yet been defined nor enforced against the states under the
supremacy clause. Bingham advocated a highly structured and
broad view of what he believed the Constitution ought to mean, in a
cause that by the beginning of the Civil War extended beyond abolition to the states' duty to provide equal protection for all citizens,
including free blacks. But Bingham also recogniz~d constitutional
limits on congressional authority, and he respected the states' right to
operate within the areas of sovereignty reserved to them by the Constitution. What emerges from this admittedly limited history of
Bingham's roots prior to the framing of the fourteenth amendment is
a man with complex views, who is not a plausible candidate for
framing a constitutional amendment using code words with the narrow, precise meanings suggested by Berger.
Bingham's role in drafting and enforcing the fourteenth amendment confirms this conclusion. He did not win election to the 38th
Congress and thus did not participate in the framing of the thirteenth amendment. Upon rejoining the 39th Congress in December
1865, he was appointed to the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction and began to press for an amendment designed to protect
the freedmen from discrimination and to permit restoration of the
former Confederate states.
While the Joint Committee heard testimony on conditions in the
rebel states and debated the terms of reconstruction, the Judiciary
Committee's Chairman, Senator Trumbull, seized the initiative by
proposing bills to enlarge the powers of the Freedmen's Bureau and
to guarantee civil rights "so as to secure freedom to all persons
within the United States." 120 In addition to expanding relief efforts,
sections 7 and 8 of the Judiciary Committee's Freedmen's Bureau
Bill relied on the War Power to allow the President's military commanders and the Bureau to protect blacks in _rebel areas from racial
discrimination in enumerated "civil rights or immunities belonging
to white persons." 121 By contrast, the Civil Rights Bill used the enforcement power vested in Congress by the thirteenth amendment to
protect blacks throughout the country against such racial discrimination, but its enforcement was limited to criminal prosecutions in federal courts against violators acting ''under color of law." 122
120. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 77 (1865).
121. Id. at 209 (Sen. Johnson).
122. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211-12 (1866).
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Bingham supported the Freedmen's Bureau Bill because it was
enacted as a necessary but temporary War Power measure to protect
all citizens in the states of insurrection, 123 but he opposed the Civil
Rights Bill on constitutional and policy grounds. 124 Although Berger cites this opposition to the 1866 Act as evidence of Bingham's
narrow view of the fourteenth amendment, 125 in fact Bingham hoped
that a constitutional amendment would overcome his objections to
the Act. Both before and after he opposed the Civil Rights Bill,
Bingham tried to develop an amendment that would implement his
view of federalism and his belief in the states' responsibility to provide equal protection.
On January 12, 1866, in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction,
Bingham proposed the following amendment: "The Congress shall
have power to make all laws necessary and proper to secure to all
persons in every state within this Union equal protection in their
rights of life, liberty and property." 126 Thaddeus Stevens countered
with: "All laws, state or national, shall operate impartially and
equally on all persons without regard to race or color." Both were
submitted to a subcommittee of five, which included Bingham. On
January 20, this subcommittee proposed: "Congress shall have the
power . . . to secure to all citizens of the U.S., in every State, the
same political rights and privileges; and to all persons in every State
equal protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property." On
January 24, the Joint Committee referred this draft to a subcommittee of three, again including Bingham, which emerged with: "Congress shall have power . . . to secure to all persons in every State full
protection in the enjoyment of life, liberty, and property; and to citizens of the United States in every State the same immunities, and
123. Id at 1292.
124. Bingham objected to the Bill on two grounds. First, he thought that the thirteenth
amendment did not give Congress the power to legislate generally on civil rights and other
areas of responsibility regarding the protection of citizens, since these areas were historically
reserved to the states. Second, he argued that it would be unjust to impose criminal sanctions
on state officers acting in good faith reliance on long-standing state laws and customs of discrimination. Id at 1291-93. See text at notes 139-47 iefra. Bingham's opposition is consistent
with his structured view of federalism and state responsibilities, but Berger exaggerates when
he characterizes it as a "State's Rights manifesto." See R. BERGER, supra note l, at 119-21.
125. R. BERGER, supra note l, at 120.
126. JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE OF FIFTEEN ON RECONSTRUCTION 46 (B. Kendrick ed. 1914) (hereinafter cited as JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE]. The precise meaning, if any, that Bingham intended by use of the phrase "life, liberty or property" is unclear.
Absent additional biographical research, there is no basis for concluding that he borrowed the
phrase as a code word either for the broad "natural rights" theories of the Western Reserve
Abolitionists traced by tenBroek and Graham or for the restrictive version of "fundamental
rights" traced by Berger.
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equal political rights and privileges." 127
When the full Committee could not agree to this language, Bingham offered yet another substitute:
The Congress shall have power . . . to secure to the citizens of each
state all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states (Art.
4, Sec. 2); and to all persons in the several States equal protection in
the rights of life, liberty and property (5th Amendment). 128

The Joint Committee adopted this text, and at Bingham's urging the
House considered the resolution, H.R. 63, between February 26 and
February 28.
Although Democratic and Republican opponents argued that the
proposed amendment would vest in Congress the power to legislate
generally in areas reserved to the states, 129 Bingham saw it somewhat
differently:
Every word of the proposed amendment is today in the Constitution of
our country, save the words conferring the express grant of power upon
the Congress of the United States. 130

After explaining the roots of the proposal in the language of section
2 of article IV and the fifth amendment, Bingham continued:
Sir, it has been the want of the Republic that there was not an express grant of power in the Constitution to enable the whole people of
every State, by congressional enactment, to enforce obedience to these
requirements of the Constitution. . . .
. . . [T]he proposed amendment does not impose upon any State of
the Union, or any citizen of the Union, any obligation which is not
now enjoined upon them. 131

Bingham believed that the states ought to respect the Bill of Rights,
as well as the more amorphous "privileges and immunities." 132 He
added that "the word immunity ... means [e]xemption from unequal burdens," such as the racial restrictions imposed by Oregon
127. Id. at 60.
128. Id. at 61.
129. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1063-64 (1866) (Rep. Hale).
130. Id. at 103. The fifth amendment refers, however, to "due process,'' not the "equal
protection" framed by Bingham in H.R. 63. Cf. note 152 infra (Bingham clarifying scope,
object, and form ~f proposed amendment as finally reworked).
131. Id. See id. at 1088 (arguing that the amendment merely enables Congress to enforce
the bill of rights "as it stands in the Constitution today"). Bingham's position, that the
supremacy clause and/or the oath in article VI obliged state officials to respect the Bill of
Rights limitations, was a clever attempt to rework the abolitionists' effort to read a broad
natural rights philosophy into the Constitution. This effort had proved unavailing in the
Supreme Court. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that the fifth
amendment's provision prohibiting public takings of private property without just compensation does not apply to the states).
132. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1088-89 (1866); note 134 infra.
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against free blacks, which he had opposed in 1859. 133 Bingham,
therefore, did not limit "privileges and immunities," "life, liberty or
property," and "equal protection" to Berger's "fundamental rights"
concerning the security of person and property.
Bingham conceded that "the citizens must rely upon the State for
their protection [of the Bill of Rights] ... under the Constitution as
it now stands." 134 He nevertheless claimed that H.R. 63 would not
alter his view of federalism, but would only enable Congress to enforce the protection that state officials ought always to have provided, pursuant to their article VI oath, to all persons - including
"[t]he loyal minority of white citizens and the disfranchised colored
citizens" whom the states were seeking to render "powerless." 135
But Bingham had no answer to another objection to the proposed
amendment. Republican Representative Hotchkiss explained that
he would prefer an amendment that imposed duties on the states
directly, rather than leaving enforcement to the discretion of
Congress:
Now, if the gentlemen's object is, as I have no doubt it is, to provide
against a discrimination to the injury or exclusion of any class of citizens in any State from the privileges which other classes enjoy, the
right should be a constitutional right that cannot be wrestled from any
class of citizens, or from the citizens of any State by mere legislation.
133. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089-90 (1866). Rep. Rogers, a conservative opponent of all such antidiscrimination measures, charged:
In the State of Pennsylvania there are laws which make a distinction with regard to the
schooling of white children and the schooling of black children. It is provided that certain
schools shall be designated and set apart for white children, and certain other schools
designated and set apart for black children. Under [H.R. 63], Congress would have power
to compel the State to provide for white children and black children to attend the same
school, upon the principle that all the people in the several States shall have equal protection in all the rights oflife, liberty, and property, and all the privileges and i=unities of
citizens in the several States.
Id at app. 134. In contrast to the debates on the 1866 Civil Rights Act, see note 74 supra,
neither John Bingham nor any other supporter disagreed with Rogers's interpretation of the
broad scope of H.R. 63.
134. Id at 1093. See note 162 i'!fra.
135. Id at 1094. That oath reads as follows: "The Senators and Representatives before
mentioned, and the Members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial
Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. VI. During the ensuing debates
on the Civil Rights Bill, Bingham characterized his view of federalism with the motto "centralized government, decentralized administration." He continued to argue that H.R. 63 adhered
to this creed:
(T]he care of the property, the liberty, the life of the citizen ... is in the States, and not in
the federal government. I have sought to effect no change in that respect in the Constitution of the country. I have advocated here an amendment [H.R. 63] which would arm
Congress with the power to compel obedience to the oath [of the supremacy clause], and
punish all violations by State officers of the bill of rights, but leaving those officers to
discharge the duties enjoined upon them.
Id at 1292.
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But this amendment proposes to leave it to the caprice of
Congress. . . .
I want them secured by a constitutional amendment that legislation
cannot override. Then if the gentleman wishes to go further, and provide by laws of Congress for the enforcement of those rights, I will go
with him.136

Here, of course, was the very form that sections 1 and 5 of the fourteenth amendment would eventually take. Hotchkiss continued:
Why not provide by an amendment to the Constitution that no State
shall discriminate against any class of its citizens; and let that amendment stand as part of the organic law of the land, subject only to be
defeated by another constitutional amendment. We may pass laws here
today, and the next Congress may wipe them out. Where is your guarantee then? 137

With that, Bingham joined Hotchkiss, first, in defeating the conservatives' motion to table "the whole subject," and then in postponing
consideration of the proposed amendment until it could be
reworked. 138
While the Joint Committee was considering alternative language
for the amendment, Congress debated and passed Trumbull's Civil
Rights Bill over President Johnson's veto. During the debate on that
Bill, Bingham attempted to minimize the damage to his view of federalism and state responsibility by proposing that Congress delete
the sentence providing for "no discrimination in civil rights"
(thereby limiting the Bill to the enumerated rights), and remove all
penal sanctions. 139 This deletion incident, however, does not support
Berger's assertions that Bingham favored most racial discrimination,
and that he propounded a "States' Rights manifesto." 140 Instead,
Bingham argued that the phrase "civil rights" could not be narrowly
limited, as suggested by House floor manager Wilson, to the rights
enumerated in the remainder of the Bill, but comprehended all "social" or "political" rights, like Negro suffrage and the right to testify
in court. 141 Bingham believed that the thirteenth amendment did
not authorize the legislation, and he disapproved of the Act's mode
of enforcement: It would strike down almost every state constitution
by imposing penal sanctions on state officers who had relied in good
faith on established state laws and customs of discrimination. 142
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id at 1095.
Id
Id.
Id at 1291.
See R. BERGER, supra note I, at 120-22; Berger, supra note 97, at 551.
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291, 1293 (1866).
See id at 1292.
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This lack of congressional power was, of course, precisely what
Bingham designed his proposed amendment, H.R. 63, to remedy.
Read in the context of his other antidiscrimination statements, therefore, his objections to the "no discrimination" clause should not be
read to approve of most state discrimination. Bingham specifically
denied such intent, claiming that, "I make no captious objection to
any legislation in favor of the rights of all before the law." 143 He
also added that the terms of the proposed Civil Rights Bill
should be the law of every State, by the voluntary act of every State.
The law in every State should be just; it should be no respecter of persons. It is otherwise now, and it has been otherwise for many years in
many States of the Union. I should remedy that not by an arbitrary
assumption of power [by Congress] but by amending the Constitution
of the United States, expressly prohibiting the States from any such
abuse of power in the future. 144

These are not the words of a person who believed in the states' right
to discriminate. 145
Although Bingham's initial proposal to delete both the "no discrimination" clause and the criminal sanctions was defeated, the
Civil Rights Bill was sent back to Committee for deletion of the "no
discrimination" clause alone. When the Bill emerged without this
clause, Bingham voted against it 146 and against overriding Johnson's
veto. 147 Bingham's statements opposing the Act are not free from
ambiguity, but the full context confirms that he objected not to the
substance of a broadly conceived "no discrimination" guarantee, but
to the form and methods used in the Act. This understanding of the
"deletion incident" is consistent with Bingham's structured view of
federalism.
With President Johnson's call for immediate readmission of the
rebel states and opposition to the Civil Rights Act, the fate of the
Republican party in the upcoming fall elections was tied to prompt
formulation of an alternative Reconstruction policy. The Joint
Committee was under the gun. 148 Senator Stewart proposed "uni143. Id at 1291.
144. Id
145. JJut see R. BERGER, supra note l, at 120. Indeed, if the phrase "privileges or immunities" is supposed to be a term of art for "civil rights," cf. id. at 30, 30-32, then John Bingham
unequivocally expressed his understanding that the phrase embraced all "social" and "political
rights," unless expressly excluded. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1291-93 (1866);
text at note 141, supra.
146. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess 1367 (1866).
147. See id. at 1861. Bingham did not actually vote. Instead, he agreed to "pair" his vote
with those of two representatives who wanted to vote for the override, but who could not
attend the voting.
148. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 42, at 1281.

January 1982)

Equal Protection Clause

491

versal amnesty" for former Confederates and an amendment guaranteeing ''universal suffrage." 149 Representative Stevens offered an
alternative amendment in five sections:
1. No racial discrimination in civil rights;
2. After July 4, 1876, no racial discrimination in the suffrage;
3. Until July 4, 1876, a racial class discriminated against in the
suffrage would not be counted for the basis of representation;
4. Rebel debts and claims would not be paid;
5. Congress would have the power to enforce. 150

Once the amendment became law, any ratifying rebel state that conformed its laws to section 1 would be readmitted to representation in
Congress.
Bingham repeatedly proposed changes in the section prohibiting
racial discrimination in civil rights: He suggested the use of more
general language, or the addition of the privileges or immunities,
due process, and equal protection clauses. Despite several committee votes to reject this approach, Bingham finally prevailed. 151 Sections 1 and 5 as proposed by the Joint Committee to Congress on
April 30 read:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of its laws.
The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article. 152

Sections 2, 3, and 4 compromised the remaining issues by limiting
the basis for representation in states that excluded any male over
twenty-one from the vote, by preventing supporters of the rebellion
from voting in federal elections for four years, and by disclaiming
the Confederate debt. The Committee also proposed two bills. The
first provided for readmission of rebel states that ratified the amendment and conformed their laws to section 1; the second disqualifi.ed
Confederate leaders from holding office.
149. See id at 1282.
150. See id; JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE, supra note 126, at 83-84.
151. See generally H. FLACK, supra note 32, at 56-68; JOURNAL OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE,
supra note 126, at 83-120.
152. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866). In contrast to H.R. 63, see text at
note 128, Bingham's final proposal (1) imposed duties directly on the states but gave Congress
the power to enforce these duties, (2) made clear that the privileges or immunities clause provided for national rights rather than just comity within any state for interstate travelers, (3)
tied "due process" to "life, liberty and property," and (4) applied "equal protection" to "laws"
without any limitation.
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On May 10, 1866, Bingham explained his proposal for Reconstruction to the House:
The want of the Republic today is not a Democratic Party, is not a
Republican party, is not any party save a party for the Union, for the
Constitution, for the supremacy of the laws, for the restoration of all
the States to their political rights and powers under such irrevocable
guarantees as will forevermore secure the safety of the Republic, the
equality of the States, and the equal rights of all the people under the
sanctions of inviolable law. 153
Section I would "protect by national law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic and the inborn rights of every
person within its jurisdiction wherever the same shall be abridged or
denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State." 154 Bingham repeated his claim that the states had always been obligated to protect
all of their citizens:
No State ever had the right, under the forms of law or otherwise, to
deny to any freeman the equal protection of the laws or to abridge the
privileges or immunities of any citizen of the Republic, although many
of them have assumed and exercised the power, and that without
remedy. 155
Bingham agreed that section 2 "excludes the conclusion that by
the first section suffrage is subjected to congressional law," 156 but he
offered no other limitation on the scope of "privileges or immunities" or on the sweep of the equal protection clause. Consistent with
the language that he drafted, Bingham nowhere suggested that equal
protection should be limited to state statutes or tied only to "privileges or immunities" and "life, liberty or property." Moreover, he
did not suggest that section I incorporated only the quite different
language of the 1866 Civil Rights Act; nor did he recant his view that
the term "civil rights" included all "social" and "political" rights,
except when expressly excluded, as section 2 excluded the franchise.
Thereafter, Bingham repeatedly confirmed his broad view of
state responsibilities under section I and Congress's enforcement
power under section 5. On June 5, 1866, after the House had passed
the fourteenth amendment, the Speaker announced that the next order would be H.R. 63, Bingham's original proposal to empower Congress to pass civil rights and antidiscrimination legislation. Bingham
responded: "I move that this joint resolution be indefinitely postponed for the reason that the constitutional amendment already
153.
154.
155.
156.

CoNG.
Id.
Id.
Id.

GLOBE,

39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2542 (1866).
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passed by the House covers the whole subject matter." 157 The motion promptly passed. Bingham later argued that whenever a state
failed to protect its citizens, Congress should legislate directly on the
subject. 158 He introduced such a bill, the Enforcement Act of 1870,
to remedy the failure of state officials to halt Ku Klux Klan violence
that kept blacks and Republican loyalists from the polls. 159
Bingham also supported the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which invoked section 1 of the fourteenth amendment to redress the states'
failure to protect blacks and their sympathizers from Klan intimidation and violence. 160 In the face of opposition charges that the defeat
of H.R. 63 showed that Congress lacked the power to legislate concerning such state defaults, Bingham responded that he had merely
placed H.R. 63 in ·"another form ... in a better form." 161 For Bingham, the fourteenth amendment "differs [from H.R. 63] in this: that
it is, as it now stands in the Constitution, more comprehensive than
as it was first proposed and reported in February 1866. It embraces
all and more than did the February proposition." 162 He then argued
at length that section 1 authorized Congress to legislate against state
failures, 163 noting that it required the states to protect fully and
equally citizens' civil rights, while section 5 expressly granted Congress the power to remedy "all . . . abuses and denials of right .
in States and by States, or combinations of persons." 164
157. Id at 2980.
158. See CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 727 (1869). Senator Sumner expressed a
somewhat more radical view:
Nobody can vindicate Caste, whether civil or political, the direct offspring of slavery, as
beyond the reach of national prohibition. . . . I have warred with Slavery too long not to
be aroused where this old enemy shows its head under another alias. It was once Slavery;
it is now Caste; and the same excuse is assigned now as then . . . State Rights. . . . [A)
State transcends its proper function when it interferes with those equal rights, whether
civil or political, which by the Declaration of Independence, and repeated texts of the
national constitution, are under the safeguard of the nation.
Id at 707. See generally Frantz, supra note 32.
159. In the Senate, the bill was amended to substitute the actions of "any person" for "any
officer." Senators Stewart and Pool apparently prevailed with their thesis that when a state
failed in its affirmative duty under § 1 to protect the freedmen's right to vote, Congress may
provide plenary protection by legislating directly against private intimidation, as well as official neglect, under the enforcement power of§ 5. See CONG. GLOBE,· 41st Cong., 2d Sess.
3611, 3613, 3662-63 (Sen. Pool) (1870). See generally Frantz, supra note 32.
160. See text at notes 86-90 supra.
161. CoNG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 115 (1871).
162. Id at app. 83. Bingham added that he came to understand that Barron v. Baltimore
held that the guarantees of the Bill of Rights did not bind the states; thus, in Bingham's view
§ 1 filled this gap and § 5 gave Congress the power to enforce § l's direct limitation on the
states. See id at app. 84. Representative Hale, an opponent of H.R. 63, confirmed Bingham's
understanding during debate on the 1875 Civil Rights Act. See 3 CONG. RECORD, 979-80
(1875); text at notes 129-37, 1S7 supra.
163. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong. 1st Sess., app. 83 (1871)
164. Id at app. 85 (1871).
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There is thus extensive evidence that John Bingham did not intend the fourteenth amendment to contain narrow code words of
limited reach. 165 In his mind, the phrases "privileges or immunities," "due process," "life, liberty or property," "equal protection of
the laws," and "no State shall deny" were not limited to racially partial legislation providing some narrowly enumerated rights to whites
but not to blacks. To the contrary, he argued in broad, sometimes
rambling terms that states had always borne an affirmative responsibility to "enforce the rights of the people under the Constitution." 166
In the fourteenth amendment, the people imposed these duties directly on the states and gave Congress the power and the responsibility to enforce these state duties and to remedy any state defaults.
Bingham's understanding of section 5 is summed up in his rhetorical
question: "Why not in advance provide against the denial of rights
by States, whether the denial be acts of omission or commission, as
well as against the unlawful acts of combinations and conspiracies
against the rights of the people?" 167 In these statements, we see
Bingham's creed for federalism - "[c]entralized power, decentralized administration." 168
Bingham may sometimes have obscured his vision in the flood of
his rhetoric and extended discourse. But his framing of the fourteenth amendment provides additional evidence that the phrases of
section 1 were intended to be broad, not narrow; general, not specific; open-ended, not limited. Unless Bingham is to be entirely discounted, 169 his framing also counsels that the text of the fourteenth
amendment is constitutional in scope, not statutory in precision. 170
The significance of Bingham's views, of course, lies in part in the
extent to which Congress endorsed them when voting on the fourteenth amendment. The following section therefore turns to the evidence offered by Congress's consideration of the amendment.
IV.

THE DEBATES ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: CODE
WORDS OR GENERALITY?

After the false start with H.R. 63, the Joint Committee intro165. .But see R. BERGER, supra note I, at 120-22; Berger, supra note 97, at 551.
166. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., app. 85 (1871).
167. Id
168. Id
169. See C. FAIRMAN, supra note 42, at 1289.
170. This does not mean that Bingham adopted verbatim the code words of the Western
• Reserve Abolitionists. Although their natural rights philosophy may provide one source for
understanding Bingham's views on the states' duties to their citizens, the limited evidence does
not prove that he intended.§ I to incorporate Western Reserve phraseology.
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duced the fourteenth amendment in both Houses on April 30,
1866. 171 Because of the political power struggle between Republicans and Democrats, the debates focused primarily on the terms for
Reconstruction - including disqualifying rebel leaders from office
and reducing the representation of any state that denied freedmen
the vote. In the limit€?d debate concerning sections 1 and 5, "declamation abounded where hard analysis was wanting." 172 The amount
of evidence that supports an open-ended reading of the amendment
makes it difficult to see how such general debate could prove Berger's claims that the fourteenth amendment dealt solely with the
rights enumerated in the 1866 Act, and that "equal protection of the
laws" was limited to statutes concerning "privileges or immunities."
The discussion of the amendment's language also casts doubt on
Berger's assertion that it was constructed of narrow code words with
generally accepted meanings.
Thaddeus Stevens opened the debate in the House with a call to
recognize the difficulties involved in developing "a plan for rebuilding a shattered nation." He pointed out that the amendment was
shaped by the unfortunate but real need to compromise some of the
most radical reconstruction programs to ensure ratification. Stevens,
however, referred specifically to only two such compromises. The
first was the amendment's omission of black suffrage and the resulting compromise calling for reduction of the basis for representation
in states that denied freedmen the vote. The second was the "too
lenient" provision for keeping Confederates from public offi.ce. 173
Stevens spoke only briefly and in general terms about sections 1
and 5. He noted that while section l's provisions "are all asserted, in
some form or other, in our DECLARATION or organic law," the
Constitution as it then stood limited only the Congress, and not the
states. 174 The amendment remedies "that defect, and allows Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States, so far that the law
which operates upon one man shall operate equally upon all." 175
Stevens did not limit the scope of the equal protection clause to
"privileges or immunities" and the rights enumerated in the 1866
Civil Rights Act. In fact, he pushed the equality principle to its
limits:
171.
GLOBE,
172.
173.
174.
175.

H.R. J. Res. 127, CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2286 (1866); S.J. Res. 78, CONG.
39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2265 (1866).
C. FAIRMAN, supra note 42, at 1283.
CoNG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459-60 (1869).
Id at 2459 (emphasis in original).
Id (emphasis in original).

496

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 80:462

Whatever law punishes a white man for a crime shall punish the black
man precisely in the same way and to the same d~gree. Whatever law
protects the white man shall afford "equal" protection to the black
man. Whatever means of redress is afforded to one shall be afforded to
all.116

After giving some examples of existing racial discrimination, Stevens
added, "I need not enumerate these partial and oppressive laws.
Unless the Constitution should restrain them those States will all, I
fear, keep up this discrimination, and crush to death the hated freedmen." 177 To the suggestion that Trumbull's 1866 Civil Rights Act
"secures the same things," Stevens replied, "[t]hat is partly true." He
added that "a law is repeatable by a majority," but "[t]his amendment once adopted cannot be annulled without two thirds of Congress. That [its opponents] will hardly get." 178 In sum, Stevens
seemed to say that although section I would constitutionalize the
1866 Act, it was not necessarily limited to that purpose. 179
Representative Garfield also supported the proposed amendment. He regretted that the right to vote - a right "equal to natural
rights" - could not yet be included in the Constitution, but stated
his willingness "to take what I can get." 180 In particular, Garfield
was "glad to see this first section here which proposes to hold over
every American citizen, without regard to color, the protecting shield
of law." 181 Garfield followed this broad definition of equal protection by countering the conservative charge that the adoption of the
fourteenth amendment would prove that Congress lacked the power
to enact the 1866 Civil Rights Act under the thirteenth amendment:
Section 1 would "lift" the Act above legislative repeal by the Democrats if they ever regained control of Congress. "For this reason, and
not because I believe the civil rights bill unconstitutional, I am glad
to see that first section here." 1B2
Comments about "constitutionalizing" the 1866 Civil Rights Act
are not free from ambiguity, 183 but they do not prove that was the
176. Id
177. Id
178. Id
179. Such vagueness about the reach of§ l also served to blunt the continuing conservative charge that Congress lacked the authority to enact the 1866 Civil Rights Act under the
thirteenth amendment. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2461 (1866) (Rep.
Finck).
180. Id at 2462.
181. Id See note 94 supra.
182. Id
183. See id at 2498 (Rep. Broomall), 2512-13, 2560 (Rep. Raymond), 2505 (Rep. Wilson),
2511 (Rep. Eliot).
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only purpose of section 1. The general, broad-brush descriptions of
section l's reach, 184 the different roads to framing section 1 and the
1866 Civil Rights Act, and their contrasting texts and structures all
suggest otherwise. In addition, conservative opponents, who had
previously argued that the 1866 Civil Rights Act broadly intruded on
the power reserved to the states, 185 claimed that the clauses of section
1 possessed no precise or agreed meaning 186 but embraced "all the
rights we have under the laws of the country." 187 Joint Committee
member Rogers, for example, opposed the fourteenth amendment by
charging that such conditions as marriage, jury service, and officeholding were covered by the broad and undefined phrases. 188 Although exaggerating the scope of pending legislation to make it appear more unattractive is a classic opposition technique, the
proponents did not dispute these broad interpretations of section 1 of
the fourteenth amendment, as they had so vigorously in the prior
debate on the Civil Rights Bill. Rather than delete broad phrases or
enumerate specific rights, the House passed the general text of the
fourteenth amendment intact. 189 In conjunction with Bingham's
reading of section 1, 190 the House debates on the fourteenth amendment provide additional evidence of the broad sweep of its
language. 191
Senator Howard opened the Senate debate on the Joint Committee's proposed amendment. Concerning section 1, he first noted the
three separate clauses. 192 Howard then addressed the difficulty in
defining the term "citizen" and expressed puzzlement over the precise meaning, if any, of the privileges or immunities clause. 193 He
184. See, e.g., id at 2510 (Rep. Miller), 2511 (Rep. Eliot), 2512 (Rep. Wilson), 2539 (Rep.
Farnsworth).
185. See, e.g., id at 2500 (Rep. Shanklin), 2530 (Rep. Randall).
186. E.g., id at 2467 (Rep. Boyer).
187. Id at 2538 (Rep. Rogers).
188. Id
189. See note 133 supra, for the proponents' similarly silent reaction to Rogers's charge
that H.R. 63 authorized Congress to prohibit racially dual schooling. In the House debates on
the fourteenth amendment, however, segregation was not mentioned.
190. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2541-44 (1866); text at notes 153-56 supra.
Whether Bingham's discourse is understood as vague, see C. FAIRMAN, supra note 42, at 128790, or broad, see text at notes 153-56 supra, his remarks provide no evidence that § 1 was
intended to have only a narrow scope or specific meaning limited to the most restrictive reading of the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
191. The House approved the Joint Committee's proposals without amendment on May
10, 1866, by a vote of 128 to 37, with 19 members not voting. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2545 (1866).
192. See id at 2765-66.
193. Id at 2765.
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quoted at length from Circuit Judge Washington's opinion in
C01jield v. Coryell, 194 which discussed the possible meaning of the
phrase in section 2 of article IV. 195 Howard added: "[T]hese privileges and immunities, whatever they may be -for they are not and
cannot be fully defined in their entire extent and precise nature - to
these should be added the personal rights guaranteed and secured by
the first eight amendments of the Constitution." 196 He continued,
"The great object of the first section of this amendment is, therefore,
to restrain the power of the States and compel them at all times to
respect these great fundamental guarantees." 197 Nowhere did Howard suggest that "these privileges or immunities" were limited to the
rights enumerated in the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
194. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230).
195. Id. The portion quoted by Howard reads as follows:
The next question is whether this act infringes that section of the Constitution which
declares that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States?" The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those
privile~es and immunities which are in their nature fundamental, which belong of right to
the cittzens of all free Governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed oy the
citizens of the several States which compose this Union from the time of their becoming
free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are it would, perhaps, be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however, be all comprehended under the fallowing general heads: protection by the Government, the
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess property of every kind,
and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety, subject nevertheless to such restraints as
the Government may justly prescribe for the general good of the whole. The right of a
citizen of one State to pass tlirough or to reside in any other State, for purposes of trade,
agriculture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas
corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the State; to take,
hold, and dispose of property, either real or personal, and an exemption from higher taxes
or impositions than are paid by the other citizens of the State, may be mentioned as some
of the particular privileges and immunities of citizens which are clearly embraced by the
general description of privileges deemed to be fundamental, to which may be added the
elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the State in
which it is to be exercised. These, and many others which might be mentioned, are, strictly
speaking, privileges and immunities, and the enjoyment of them by the citizens of each
State in every other State was manifestly calculated (to use the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding provision in the old Articles of Confederation) "the better to
secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different States of the Union."
6 F. Cas. at 551-52 (emphasis added). As Ely cogently comments: "Berger ... emphasizes
the word 'confining' that appears in the [third] sentence of the quotation, apparently without
noticing that read in context what Washington says, in essence, is that he feels 'no hesitation in
confining' privileges and immunities to everything but the kitchen sink." J. ELY, supra note 6,
at 198 n.64 (quoting R. BERGER, supra note I, at 22, 31) (citations omitted). With the exception of black suffrage, Senator Howard proceeded to throw in the sink. See text at note 196
infta.
196. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2765 (1866) {emphasis added). The point is not
that the framers specifically intended to incorporate the Bill of Rights, but that the phrase
"privileges or immunities" was not generally understood by most proponents and opponents as
a precise code word for the narrowest reading of the rights enumerated in the 1866 Civil
Rights Act But cf. note 94 supra (Rep. Garfield arguing in 1871 that "privileges or immunities" originated in the 1866 Civil Rights Act, not H.R. 63).
197. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866).
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As for the equal protection clause, Howard said that it "abolishes
all class legislation in the States and does away with the injustice of
subjecting one caste of persons to a code not applicable to another." 198 The only limitation that Howard expressly placed on section 1 related to black voting: it was, despite Howard's wishes, not
covered. 199 He concluded:
[Section 1] establishes equality before the law, and it gives to the humblest, the poorest, the most despised of the race the same rights and the
same protection before the law as it gives to the most powerful, the
most wealthy or the most haughty. That, sir, is republican government,
as I understand it, and the only one which can claim the praise of a just
government. Without this principle of equal justice to all men and
equal protection under the shield of the law, there is no republican
government and none that is really worth maintaining. 200

Several Senators immediately proposed changes in the wording
of sections 2 and 3.201 On May 29, the Senate, at Howard's urging,
agreed to strike the section 3 proposed by the Joint Committee and
to consider modifying other sections.202 On May 30, following an
agreement hammered out in the Republican caucus, the Senate took
up Howard's suggestions. The first added a provision to section 1 to
clarify what "persons" are citizens and to bury the contrary conclusion of .Dred Scott forever: "All persons born in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside." 203 After a desultory
debate about "Indians not taxed," 204 gypsies, Mongolians, Chinese,
and Mexjcans,205 the Senate added the citizenship clause to section
1.206 Howard then advanced modifications of sections 2 and 3.207
These inspired more debate and a series of additional proposals.
The Republican majority finally passed the Joint Committee's proposed amendment and program of Reconstruction with Howard's
modifications, which reflected the ultimate form of the fourteenth
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id (emphasis added).
See id at 2766-67.
Id at 2766.
See id at 2767-70.
Id at 2869.
Id at 2890.
This phrase was used in the 1866 Civil Rights Act to limit citizenship. See note 18

supra.
205. CONG. GLOBE, _39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2890-97 (1866).
206. Id at 2897.
207. Id Section 2 reduced the basis for representation by the same proportion as the suffrage was denied or abridged to males over 21 years of age. Section 3 excluded from office
Confederate leaders who had violated oaths to the United States Constitution; the disability
could only be lifted by a two-thirds vote of each House of Congress.

500

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 80:462

amendment. 208
Debate on the merits of section 1 was scanty, and went into little
detail. Senator Poland, a supporter, argued that the proposed privileges or immunities clause merely incorporated the words from section 2 of article IV with all of their ambiguity. 209 His reference to
the equal protection clause was just as summ~ry:
It is the very spirit and inspiration of our system of government, the
absolute foundation upon which it was established. It is essentially declared in the Declaration of Independence and in all the provisions of
the Constitution. Notwithstanding this we know that State laws exist,
and some of them of very recent enactment, in direct violation of these
principles. Congress has already shown its desire and intention to uproot and destroy all such partial state legislation in the passage of what
is called the civil rights bill. . . . It certainly seems desirable that no
doubt should be left existing as to the power of Congress to enforce ·
principles lying at the very foundation of all republican government if
they be denied or violated by the States . . . .210

Apparently, Poland either thought that the 1866 Civil Rights Act applied to all racially partial legislation, or recognized that the equal
protection clause did not merely prohibit the Black Codes. Consistent with this reading, he did not suggest that the equal protection
clause was limited to laws affecting "privileges or immunities."211
The only limitation on section 1 that Poland noted was its failure to
guarantee black suffrage; like several of his brethren in the House,
Poland criticized this limitation.212 Such general statements about
the sweep of section 1 and the extent to which it constitutionalized
the Civil Rights Act are similar to those offered in the House,.and do
not support Berger's restrictive reading of the section. 213
208. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2897-902, 2914-21, 2938-44, 2986-93, 301011, 3027-42 (1866).
209. Id. at 2961. But the text of the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment provided for national rights for United States citizens, see notes 25 & 152 supra,
not comity by any state to persons visiting from another state, as some read§ 2 of article IV.
E.g., Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 422-23 (1857). Although some Republicans argued that the comity clause and Co,fte/d provided for national rights, see Curtis, supra
note 7, at 77, 86-87, the rephrasing of the privileges or immunities clause in the fourteenth
amendment to provide expressly for national rights removed all doubts.
210. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2961 (1866) (emphasis added).
211. See also id. at 2896 (Sen. Fessenden, Chairman of Joint Committee, arguing that the
addition of the citizenship clause had "no reference to the civil rights bill").
212. Id. at 2963-64.
213. Thereafter, Senator Stewart acquiesced in the Joint Committee's proposed amendment as modified by the Senate Republican caucus: "I recognize the obligation of full protection for all men. . . ." He hoped that the proposal might lead in time to "universal amnesty
and impartial suffrage." Id. at 2964. See also the similar comments of Senators Johnson,
Yates, and Howe, id. at 3035, 3037, app. 219-20. The fifteenth amendment sought to answer
their express hope within three years.
Senator Howe followed with a rambling discourse arguing that § I was aimed generally at

January 1982]

Equal Protection Clause

501

On the final day of the debate, Senator Hendricks, a Democratic
opponent, complained that the phrases of section 1 - including
"privileges or immunities," "abridge," and "deny," - were "vague,"
"of uncertain legal meaning," and "doubtful sentences."214 Shortly
thereafter, Reverdy Johnson, another conservative opponent, moved
to strike the privileges or immunities clause entirely "because I do
not understand what will be the effect of that." 215 The Republican
majority, however, made no attempt to limit section l's reach and
passed the fourteenth amendment intact by a vote of thirty-three to
eleven, with five absent. 216 Unlike the supporters of the earlier Civil
Rights Act, the amendment's Senate proponents did not limit, particularize, or enumerate the rights covered by the fourteenth amendment. With virtually no debate, the House on June 13 acquiesced in
the Senate's modifications by a vote of 120 to thirty-two, with thirtytwo not voting, and the proposed amendment passed to the states for
ratification. 217
Although debate on section I was relatively meager and is subject to conflicting interpretations, the evidence that is there does not
show that the privileges or immunities clause was intended to have a
precisely limited scope or that it incorporates only the rights enumerated in the 1866 Civil Rights Act. There is even less evidence that
the framers intended to restrict the equal protection clause to the
terms of the Civil Rights Act, to the Black Codes, or to "privileges or
immunities," however they might be defined. In fact, the only consistently mentioned limit on the amendment was that it did not give
black citizens the right to vote. Consistent with the text, the evils
addressed, and John Bingham's drafting, the congressional debates
unequal laws, such as (not limited to) the Black Codes. Id at app. 218-19. Among the discriminatory codes cited is one purporting to provide a fund for colored schools. Howe mocked
this code as a "crime" providing virtually no funds for the education of black children. This is
the only reference, oblique at that, to segregated schools in the Senate debate. It provides
additional evidence that the framers did not intend to limit the reach of the equal protection
clause to rights relating to the security of person and property as defined by Berger.
214. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 3039-40 (1866).
215. Id at 3041.
216. Id at 3042.
217. Id at 3149. In the final debate, Stevens repeated his refrain that the amendment
provided less than he hoped but as much as he expected. Id at 3148. Concerning§ I, Rep.
Defrees stated:
[It] indisputably fixes the character of those who are entitled to be regarded as citizens of
the United States or citizens of the several States, and secures to all life, liberty and property, and places all persons upon an equality, regardless of their condition or color, so far
as equal protection of"the law is concerned. Certainly none can take exception to the
provisions of this section.
Id at app. 227. Conservative Democrats inveighed against the broad sweep of the amendment
on procedural, substantive, textual, and racial grounds. See, e.g., id at 3145-46 (Rep. Finck),
3147 (Rep. Harding), app. 230 (Rep. Rogers), app. 242-43 (Rep. Davis).
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suggest that section 1 - particularly the equal protection clause was framed in general terms and did not have a generally accepted
and narrowly limited meaning. 2 1s
V.

THE RECONSTRUCTION CONGRESS AND SCHOOL
SEGREGATION: CONDONED, CONDEMNED, OR LEFT
OPEN FOR DECISION UNDER THE EQUAL
-PROTECTION CLAUSE?

This interpretation of the fourteenth amendment is supported by
an examination of the Reconstruction Congress's handling of a particular form of racial discrimination that even then attracted attention: segregation in the schools. Berger notes that Congress
repeatedly rejected legislation providing for integrated schools, and
he concludes that the framers did not intend the fourteenth amendment to authorize desegregation. Berger's conclusion, however, does
not necessarily follow: It proves nothing to say that the framers had
no present intent to outlaw school segregation by specific statute; the
question is whether they could have intended that future Congresses
or the Court be free to do so under the authority of the more general
fourteenth amendment.
Berger's conclusion apparently rests on two grounds: first, that
school segregation does not implicate any of the fundamental rights
to which he limits the amendment; and second, that the pervasiveness of segregation at that time indicates that equal protection was
not intended to prohibit racially dual schooling and, at most, guaranteed only "separate but equal" facilities. The materials discussed
in the preceding sections of this Article do not support Berger's assertion that the fourteenth amendment protects only a narrow range
of rights affecting the security of person and property; the subsequent legislative proposals regarding schools do not suggest a different conclusion. Proponents of contemporary legislation to prohibit
segregation asserted that schools were covered by the fourteenth
amendment. These proposals necessarily suggest that some Congressmen believed that school segregation was unconstitutional. The
proposals were not rejected because Congress considered segregation
in general or in public schools in particular to be beyond the scope of
218. That politics, racism, and Reconstruction further cloud the brief debate only lends
credence to Bickel's understanding of the process of framing a constitution - the tendency to
use "such generalities as could command general assent," and to avoid specifics that would
fuel controversy wherever possible. A. BICKEL, supra note 5, at 105. That does not necessarily
mean, however, that § 1 had no core focus with respect to racial discrimination, even if evolving over time to comprehend new circumstances, experience, and insight. Sandalow, supra
note 5, at 1064-68.
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the fourteenth amendment, but because passage was politically impossible at that time.
Before we examine the debates on legislation regarding the
schools, one point regarding segregation in general should be noted.
Segregation was not uncommon when the fourteenth amendment
was ratified. Schools were segregated in many areas, including by
local action in the District of Columbia, and some states prohibited
publicly supported education for blacks.219 Some other public facilities, including the galleries of the House and Senate, were segregated. Similar racial restrictions were imposed in some areas with
respect to the rights that Berger argues were specifically intended by
the framers for protection under the 1866 Civil Rights Act and section 1 of the fourteenth amendment. But even congressional refusal
to pass statutes specifically outlawing all segregation in the enjoyment of these protected rights would not imply that the framers intended the fourteenth amendment to condone segregation for all
time. It would only suggest that the Reconstruction Congress was
then unable to perceive segregation as imposing caste or unwilling to
legislate against such discriminatory practices in every instance.
Concerning public schools, the record of Congress indicates just
such a reluctance to legislate. Senator Charles Sumner led the frontal assault on separate schools in Congress, as he had earlier in Massachusetts. He opened his campaign on March 16, 1867, after
Congress had passed both the fourteenth amendment and the Military Reconstruction Act, by introducing a rider requiring the rebel
states to establish "public schools open to all, without distinction of
race or color." 220 The lack of popular support for mixed schools
generally frustrated Sumner's eight-year campaign in Congress to
legislate specifically against separate schools.221 But Congress also
repeatedly refused to declare that it would be unconstitutional to
pass such legislation.
Congress did prohibit some states from mandating segregated
schools. When Virginia elected a governor who promised to impose
segregated• schools, Congress passed a rider readmitting Virginia to
congressional representation on the "condition-subsequent" that
219. See generally M. WEINBERG, A CHANCE TO LEARN (1977).
220. CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 1st Sess. 165 (1867). The Senate twice rejected the proposal. Id at 165-70, 580-81.
221. See Kelly, The Congressional Controversy Over School Segregation, 1867-1875, 64
AM. HIST. REV. 537 (1959). Sumner's earlier political success on the issue in his home state,
however, was matched by the state constitutions prohibiting racial segregation in schools
adopted in 1868 by radical conventions in South Carolina and Louisiana. See, e.g., id at 54042; s.c. CONST. art. X, § IO (1868).
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"the Constitution of Virginia shall never be so amended as to deprive any citizen or class of citizens of the United States of the school
rights and privileges secured by the constitution of said State."222
Similar, arguably antisegregation conditions were added to the bills
readmitting Mississippi and Texas.
Proposals to establish national subsidies to support the infant systems of common schooling became the next battleground. In the
House, conservatives were able to delete a "mixed school" requirement from one such bill when forty-three Republicans, including
Bingham and many of the central figures in the Republican Reconstruction, refused to vote on the question. Emboldened by these "silent Republican defections," 223 conservatives sought to suspend the
House rules to vote on a resolution proclaiming "that it would be
contrary to the Constitution and a tyrannical usurpation of power
for Congress to force mixed schools upon the States, and equally
unconstitutional and tyrannical for Congress to pass any law interfering with churches, public carriers or innkeepers, such subjects of
legislation belonging of right to the States respectively." But Bingham and many of his Republican colleagues emerged to defeat this
proposal.224 Similar equivocation marked Congress's attempts to
eliminate segregated schools in the District of Columbia.225
From 1870 until his death in 1874, Senator Sumner repeatedly
proposed legislation to prohibit racial discrimination in schools, accommodations, carriers, and other facilities open to the public.226
The history of this proposal indicates the extent to which political
expediency, rather than concern about constitutionality, governed
votes in Congress. When added as a rider to President Grant's proposal of amnesty for Confederate leaders, this sweeping guarantee
rekindled the debate over whether nondiscriminatory access to such
facilities was a "civil right" under the 1866 Act, a "privilege or immunity of citizenship" under the fourteenth amendment, or a "social
right" beyond the reach of either. 227 Sumner's view of the fourteenth
amendment prevailed when the Vice-President settled a tie vote in
222. An Act to Admit the State of Virginia to Representation in the Congress of the United
States, ch. X, 16 Stat. 62 (1870); CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 643-44, 720. These "conditions subsequent" were of dubious constitutionality; and Bingham, ever the "strict constructionist'' within his own structured view of federalism and belief in full readmission of the
Southern states, objected on that ground to such provisions. Id at 493-95.
223. Kelly, supra note 221, at 544.
224. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 1582 (1872).
225. Kelly, supra note 221, at 545-46; Frank & Mumo, The Original Understanding of
"Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 COLUM. L. REV. 131, 157-58 {1950).
226. E.g., CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3434 (1870).
227. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 2d Sess. 381, 495, 526, 767, 843-44, 3189 (1872).
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the Senate. This broad antidiscrimination rider, however, made amnesty unpalatable to the conservatives who wanted it most, and the
bill died from lack of their support. Shortly thereafter, when amnesty suited the Republicans' political needs, the civil rights rider
was watered down so that an amnesty bill could sail through. 228 ·
Undaunted, Sumner again introduced his antisegregation bill in
December 1873 as an amendment to the 1866 Civil Rights Act. 229
House Judiciary Committee Chairman Butler introduced a similar
bill, and President Grant's annual message urged Congress to act "to
better secure the civil rights" of blacks.230 The debates in the House
and Senate raged on the impact of the Supreme Court's recent decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases on the protection afforded blacks
under the privileges or immunities clause, on the scope of the equal
protection clause, on whether public schools were covered under either, and on whether "separate but equal" schools could guarantee
"equal protection" to blacks and whites alike. 231
The Senate passed Sumner's bill two months after his death with
the "mixed school" provision intact. Section I provided that "all citizens and other persons . . . shall be entitled to the full and equal
enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of inns, public ~onveyances on land or water, theaters, and
other places of public amusement; and also of common schools and
public institutions of learning or benevolence supported, in whole or
in part, by general taxation." 232 In the House, however, this antisegregation bill languished, largely because many conservatives and
moderates charged that the "mixed school" provision would destroy
the newly forming systems of public schooling (in many places, but
by no means everywhere, separate) for blacks and whites alike. 233
Throughout the debates on the new Civil Rights Bill, proponents
stressed the states' failure to protect blacks against customs of segregation and their refusal to give blacks the benefit of common-law
guarantees of nondiscriminatory access to public facilities. 234 For
228. See Kelly, supra note 221, at 545-46.
229. 2 CONG. REC. 2 (1873).
230. Quoted in Kelly, supra note 221, at 552.
231. Compare, e.g., 2 CONG. REC. 342,376, 380-81, 383,384,405,419,420,429,454, 408485 (1873-1874) (opponents), with id at 383, 408-09, 412-14, 416, 455-59, 3451, 3454, 4116 (proponents). The point is merely that there was debate; this is sufficient to counter Berger's assertion that all of these issues were settled.
232. 2 CONG. REC. 4175 (1874).
233. See Frank & Munro, supra note 225, at 161-62; Kelly, supra note 221, at 553-54.
234. See, e.g., 2 CONG. REC. 340 (Rep. Butler), 408 (Rep. Elliott), 412 (Rep. Lawrence)
(1873-74).
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example, Representative Elliott, a black from South Carolina, answered the dual citizenship holding of the Slaughterhouse Cases in
precisely such terms:
[I]s not the denial of such [State] privileges [of nondiscriminatory access to "public conveniences of travel on public highways, of rest and
refreshment at public inns, of education in public schools"] to me a
denial to me of the equal protection of the laws? . . . All discrimination is forbidden ... all denial of equality before the law, all denial of
the equal farotection of the laws, whether State or national laws, is
forbidden. 35

When Congress reconvened in December 1874, Butler developed
a wide-ranging program to continue Republican control of Reconstruction in the face of the Democratic resurgence. 236 The Civil
Rights Bill became a cornerstone of his program, but its "mixed
school" provision engendered sufficient controversy that Butler
seemed willing to acquiesce in a conservative substitute that would
specifically authorize "separate but equal" schools, apparently in a
vain attempt to secure majority support for the rest of the package. 237
Although some moderates, black and white, suggested that neither
race had a burning desire or need for "mixed schools,"238 other
blacks and many radical Republicans expressed their outrage at any
"separate school" proyision which would "run a color line through
the schools."239 The House finally agreed to a compromise and
passed the Civil Rights Bill with no mention of schools - mixed or
separate.240
Representative Monroe discussed the nature of the opposition to
the "separate but equal" schooling proposal:
[I]t introduces formally into the statute law a discrimination between
different classes of citizens in regard to their privileges as citizens. . . .
[I]fwe once establish a discrimination of this kind we know not where
it will end. It may be extended to all the different privileges of the
citizen. Who knows what sort of discrimination will next be introduced into the statute law in reference to citizens of the country, in
regard to the privileges they are to enjoy, if we begin with a discrimination of this kind? 241

Monroe then explained the basis for the compromise deleting all
mention of schooling from the 1875 Civil Rights Act:
235. 2 CONG. REC. 409 (1874). See also id. at 412-14 (Rep. Lawrence), 416 (Rep. Walls),
457 (Rep. Butler); 3 CONG. REC. 940 (Rep. Butler) (1875).
236. See Kelly, supra note 221, at 558.
231. Id. at 558-59.
f38. See, e.g., 3 CONG. REC. 981-82 (Rep. Cain) (1875).
239. Id. at 1002 (Rep. Williams). See also id. at 999-1001 (Rep. Burrows) (advocating free
schools for children of all races and nationalities).
240. See Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335.
241. 3 CONG. REC. 997 (1875).
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The representative men of the colored race tell me that they would
rather have their people take their chances under the Constitution and
its amendments; that they would rather fall back upon the original
principles of constitutional law and take refuge under their shadow
than to begin with this poor attempt to confer upon them the privileges
of education connected with this discrimination [ie., the "separate but
equal" proviso]. 242

Under Monroe's reading, Congress avoided all legislation concerning public schooling and left the issue open for decision under the
·equal protection clause.243 Monroe's view captures the apparent intent of the Reconstruction Congress on school segregation: It was
more politically feasible to pass a general and open-ended constitutional amendment than to legislate specifically against a particular,
intractable practice of discrimination.244
VI.

Is PLESSY

OR BROWN THE STRICT CONSTRUCTION?

According to Berger, Brown v. Board of Education is wrong for
two reasons: schools are not within the limited scope of the fourteenth amendment, and the requirements of equal protection are satisfied by separate but equal facilities. Thus, the major surprise of
Berger's book is not that it criticizes Brown, but that it never addresses the propriety of the Supreme Court's 1896 decision in Plessy
v. Ferguson. 245 Unlike public schooling, freedom of movement on a
common carrier is arguably within the fundamental rights recognized by Berger, and is thus protected by the equal protection
clause. 246 Although Berger's materials on the separate but equal
242. Id. See id. at 981 (Rep. Cain); id. at 997 (Rep. Kellogg). In the end, Representative
Butler also approved this compromise, id. at 1005, and it passed 128 to 48. Id at 1010. For a
discussion of the development and debates concerning the 1875 Act, see H. FLACK, supra note
32, at 250-79. These debates provide additional evidence that the framers intended§ l, particularly the equal protection clause, to extend beyond the narrow rights enumerated by Berger,
to include as well the right of free access to inns, common carriers, theaters, public accommodations, and common schools. But see Avins, De Facio and De Jure School Segregation, 38
Miss. L.J. 179 (1967).
243. This congressional determination had the practical effect of leaving segregation in
schools up to the states for decision in the first instance. See Kelly, supra note 221, at 563.
Many Northern states responded by prohibiting school segregation, while several Southern
and border states mandated or authorized separate schools. Id.
244. See A. BICKEL, supra note 5, at 100-05. The legislative debates from 1864 through
1875 concerning civil rights, antidiscrimination, and Reconstruction reveal much more passion, prejudice, and politics than can be conveyed in any summary of their contents. But these
complicating factors merely add to the difficulty in divining any narrowly confined, but generally agreed-upon, intent of the framers.
245. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
246. Locomotion (which presumably includes freedom of movement on a common carrier)
is a fundamental right recognized by Blackstone; it is a "civil right relating to the security of
person and property" guaranteed in the 1866 Civil Rights Act, and thereafter incorporated into
the privileges or immunities clause, and protected by the equal protection clause from hostile
racial statutes discriminating against blacks. See R. BERGER, supra note l, at 20-22. In his
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question imply that Plessy was nevertheless correctly decided, he
does not forthrightly state that conclusion.
This Article undercuts Berger's assertion that the scope of the
amendment is limited, and suggests that the framers left open the
question whether state-mandated and state-condoned segregation
denies equal protection. Plessy was the Court's response. It assumed that the fourteenth amendment applied to the case before it,
treated the question whether separate is equal as one of fact to be
decided by the Court, and found that state-mandated segregation in
railroad cars was constitutionally permissible because it did not discriminate against blacks.247 On these terms, Plessy was wrongly
decided.
Homer Plessy, an octaroon who could not be distinguished by his
color from whites, argued that the evils of Louisiana's statute requiring separate coaches for blacks and whites lay in the compulsory
nature of the segregation and its stigmatization of blacks as a servile
class.248 But the majority rejected this charge of racial discrimination on factual grounds:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races
stamps the colored with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by
reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race
chooses to put that construction upon it. The plaintiff's argument necessarily assumes that if, as has been more than once the case, and is not
unlikely to be so again, the colored race should become the dominant
power in the state legislature, and should enact a law in precisely similar terms, it would thereby relegate the white race to an inferior posidissenting opinion, Justice Harlan quotes Blackstone when he notes that the power of locomotion is an important personal liberty. 163 U.S. at 557. See also Frank & Munro, supra note
225, at 150-53 (arguing that framers intended to prohibit segregation in common carriers),
247. The Court interpreted the equal protection clause as prohibiting laws passed "for the
annoyance or oppression of a particular class." 163 U.S. at 550.
248. Plessy's brief argued:
/Qt is not ofthe smallest con.sequence that the car or compartment set apartfar the Colored
is "equal" in those incidents which '!!feet physical comfort to that set apart for the Wllites.
These might even be superior without such consequence! Such considerations are not at all
of the order of those now in question. Whatever legally disparages and whatever is incident to legal disparagement is offensive to a properly constitutional mind. The White
Man's wooden railway benches, if the case were such, would be preferred to any velvet
cushions in the Colored car. If Mr. Plessy be Colored, and has tasted the advantages of
free American citizenship, and has responded to its inspirations, he abhorred the equal
acco=odations of the car to which he was compulsonly assigned!
Quoted in Fairman, The Supreme Court, 1955 Term - Foreword· The Attack on the Segregation Cases, 70 HARV. L. REV. 83, 88 (1956) (emphasis in original). ThePles-91 Court's finding
also insulted the freedman's continuing plea for abolition of the color line as articulated by
Frederick Douglas during Reconstruction:
We want mixed schools not because our colored schools are inferior - not because
colored instructors are inferior to white instructors, but because we want to do away with
a system that exalts one class and debases another.
Quoted in M. WEINBERG, supra note 219, at 51.
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tion. We imagine that the white race, at least, would not acquiesce in
this assumption. 249

As Charles Black aptly characterized this view, "the curves of callousness and stupidity intersect at their respective maxima."250
The Plessy Court, however, cast doubt on its own finding of no
discrimination. It implicitly acknowledged some discriminatory ef.fect when it argued that, to the extent that Louisiana's statute produced inequality at all, it was "social" inequality, which could not be
overcome by law, but only by "mutual appreciation of each other's
merits." 251 Furthermore, the Court reserved decision on the propriety of the statute's prohibition of a claim for damages by a white
person excluded from "the coach in which he properly belongs,"252
implying that there could be some injury. And Justice Harlan's dissent clearly described the discriminatory purpose and effect of Jim
Crow law:
Everyone knows that the statute in question had its origin in the purpose, not so much to exclude the white persons from railroad cars occupied by blacks, as to exclude colored people from coaches occupied
by or assigned to white persons. . . . The thing to accomplish was,
under the guise of giving equal accommodations for whites and blacks,
to compel the latter to keep to themselves while traveling in railroad
passenger coaches. No one would be so wanting in candor as to assert
the contrary. . . . What can more certainly arouse race hate, what
more certainly create and perpetuate a feeling of distrust between these
races, than state enactments, which in fact proceed on the ground that
colored citizens are so inferior and degraded that they cannot be allowed to sit in public coaches occupied by white citizens? That, as all
will admit, is the real meaning of legislation as was enacted in
Louisiana. 253

From this perspective, the Court's long-delayed decision in
Brown, to overrule Plessy on the ground that forced segregation
249. 163 U.S. at 551.
250. Black, The Lawfulness ofrhe Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421,422 n.8 (1960).
251. 163 U.S. at 551. Thi~ conclusion, of course, begs the question even under the narrowest reading of the "fundamental" right of locomotion. The issue still remains whether forced
segregation restricts access, on a racial basis, to co=on carriers and other modes of travel
otherwise generally open to the public on a nondiscriminatory basis. Although there is a difference between barring blacks from coaches entirely and merely confining them to separate
compartments, the factual issue of whether Jim Crow segregation amounts to a racial restriction on the freedom of locomotion cannot be bypassed. As a result, the Court in P!essy
squarely addressed this issue;.
252. See 163 U.S. at 548-49. Similarly, without addressing the question, the Court "conceded" that "the reputation of belonging to the dominant race, in this instance the white race,
is property" for which a ''white man . . . assigned to a colored coach . . . may have his action
for damages . . . ." 163 U.S. at 549 (emphasis in original).
253. 163 U.S. at 557, 560 (emphasis added). See generally W. DuBois, THE SOULS OF
BLACK FOLK (1903); C. WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JlM CROW (1957).
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amounts infact to caste discrimination against blacks, is unimpeachable: "[T]he policy of separating the races is usually interpreted as
denoting the inferiority of the Negro group. . . . Any language in
Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected." 254 The "separate-but-equal" rationale had always been an excuse for state-sanctioned racism. 255 As Edmund Cahn so aptly put the point:
The moral factors involved in racial segregation are not new . . . but
exceedingly ancient. What, after all, is the most elementary and conspicuous fact about a primitive community if not the physical proximity of human beings mingling together? . . . Hardly anyone has been
hypocritical enough to contend that no stigma or loss of status attaches
to ... physical separation. Segregation does involve stigma; the community knows it does. 25 6

On balance, then, the decision in Brown has a stronger claim
than Plessy to being a "strict" construction of the meaning of the
discrimination prohibited by the equal protection clause. The evidence indicates that the fourteenth amendment was not intenq.~d to
protect only Berger's enumerated civil rights relating to the security
of person and property. It also suggests that the issue of segregation,
particularly in schools, was left open for decision under the equal
protection clause.257 Chief Justice Warren's finding that the amend-·
254. 347 U.S. at 494-95 (1954).
255. The post-Reconstruction era Court itself sometimes chose to recognize the caste nature of such racial restrictions. For example, in the jury exclusion cases of 1880, the Court held
that the fourteenth amendment was intended to secure a
positive immunity, or right, most valuable to the colored race, - the right to exemption
from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored, - exemption from legal
discriminations, implying inferiority in civil society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps toward reducing them to the condition of a subject race.
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1880). The Court continued:
The very fact that colored people are singled out and expressly denied by a statute all
right to participate in the administration of the law, as jurors, because of their color . . . is
practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a
stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to securing to individuals of the
race that equal justice which the law aims to secure to all others.
100 U.S. at 308.
256. Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 158 (1955). See Brunson v. Board of
Trustees, 429 F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobeloff, J., concurring); United States v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 872-73 (5th Cir. 1966); L. TRIBE, supra note 31, at 1019-32;
Black, supra note 250, at 425; Pollak, Racial .Discrimination and Judicial Integrity, 108 U. PA, L.
REv. I (1959). As Cahn so convincingly demonstrated, however, this ~nderstanding of the
constitutional wrong of segregation was not aided by Chief Justice Warren's passing reference
in Brown to the "new'' studies from the "science of social psychology," 347 U.S. at 494 n.11.
See Cahn, supra, at 157-59. q. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954) (striking down
dual schooling in the District of Columbia because "[s]egregation in public education is not
reasonably related to any proper governmental objective," without reference to the "psychological impact" on particular students). Thus, the Court's opinion in Brown could have been
more straightforward in detailing the reasons for overturning the contrary finding in P/essy.
257. Early Supreme Court decisions acted on this understanding in approving segregation
in public facilities, including schools. They accepted the applicability of the equal protection
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ment's history is "inconclusive . . . with respect to segregated
schools" 258 is not far off the mark. The conclusion in Brown that
governmentally fostered or officially condoned segregation in fact
imposes caste discrimination and thereby denies the equal protection
of the laws represents a fair interpretivist construction of section I of
the fourteenth amendment.
CONCLUSION

The weight of the interpretivist materials demonstrates that section 1 of the fourteenth amendment does not precisely define the
general antidiscrimination obligations that it imposes on the states.
Under settled principles of judicial review, repeatedly confirmed by
the framers of the amendment, the Supreme Court is empowered to
define those duties and to determine whether states are adequately
discharging their responsibilities to all of their citizens. Whatever
label is applied to this judicial review - interpretivist,259 structural, 260 or fundamental value261 - the substance of the Court's
work is to interpret the amendment's core prohibition against caste
and to apply it, as the Court did in Brown, to contemporary circumstances.262 Under our federal system, such judicial vigilance will
help the people, the Congress and the states meet their own constitutional responsibilities to grapple with the monumental task that the
amendment's framers only began.
clause to a broad range of community institutions, but found no discrimination as long as the
"separate" facilities were conceived as "equal." See, e.g., Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927);
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kentucky, 179 U.S. 388 (1900); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896). Subsequent decisions also applied the equal protection clause to schools, but found
violations when segregated schools proved "unequal" in material and intangible quality.
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
258. 347 U.S. at 489. Whether the Chief and Associate Justices made this finding based
primarily on a review of the historical materials is another matter. See generally R. KLUGER,
SIMPLE JUSTICE 582-616, 653-56, 678-99, 703-13 (1975). But interpretivists may find some
solace in the exhaustive brief and appendices filed by the United States as amicus curiae in the
case. See 49 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES: CONSTlTUTlONAL LAW 113-48, 853-1054 (P. Kurland & G. Caspar eds. 1975) [hereinafter cited as LANDMARK BRIEFS]; 49a LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra, at 3-398, 739-90. The Solicitor General concluded that the framers did not specifically address the issue of segregation
(particularly in the infant systems of public schooling) in the fourteenth amendment but left
that question open for decision by the Court under the equal protection clause. For Bickel's
somewhat similar analysis for the Brown Court as a law clerk to Justice Frankfurter, see text at
notes 9-12 supra.
259. See, e.g., J. TENBROEK, supra note 22; Bickel, supra note 9; Bork, supra note 14, at 1315; .
260. See, e.g., C. BLACK, supra note 29; J. ELY, supra note 6.
261. See, e.g., A. BrcKEL,supra note 5; R DWORKIN,supra note 5, L. TRJBEsupra note 31,
at iii-iv, supp. 1-2; Brest, supra note 5; Sandalow, supra note 5, at 1068-72.
262. See generally P. DIMOND, A DILEMMA OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT 128-37 (1978); L.
TRIBE, supra note 31, at 1041-42; Brest, supra note 5; Fiss, supra note 6, at 123-24, 136-70.

